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 This dissertation utilizes the history of ideas to explore the philosophy of 
Catharine Macaulay, an eighteenth-century historian and philosopher, for 
application to contemporary American Public Administration. Macaulay’s view of 
human nature is paradoxical. Her characterization of man as corrupt and seduced 
by power is countered by her view that man is perfectible and capable of good 
works. The darker side of Macaulay’s vision supports government that checks power 
through the expansion of democracy, advocates the separation of powers, and 
adheres to the rule of law. In this respect she resembles a Lockean liberal. The more 
magnanimous side of Macaulay reveres ancient Greece and Rome, believes man is 
capable of civic virtue, and values the role of education in creating leaders. In this 
respect she resembles a classical republican. Combined, these visions offer a unique 
model of public administration. 
 A Macaulay model of public administration rests its authority with the people. 
It uses the practice of administration as a check on power by the use of 
administrative discretion and the encouragement of citizen participation. The model 
advocates a generalist rather than a technical education for public administrators. 
Finally, the model includes the practice of benevolence, the belief that democratic 
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Public administration theorists struggle with the quagmire of 
legitimacy, the issue of non-elective officers running the modern 
administrative state. In a governmental system that eschews a substantive 
policy role for appointed officers, where is the moral authority for the tens 
of thousands of managers and administrators that govern and supervise 
our cities, states, and federal bureaucracies? John Rohr (1986) grounds 
the legitimacy discussion in the US Constitution, citing both Federal and 
Anti-Federalist writers as authorities for interpreting the meaning and 
context of the Founders in creating the Constitution. Rohr opens the door 
for public administration theorists to explore influences on the Founders’ 
mindset and their ideas in the formation of a new government. He speaks 
of the “moral vitality” of the Constitution “because it is the great work of 
the founding period of the Republic” (Rohr, 1986, p. 8).  
 Following Rohr’s footsteps, other public administration theorists have 
joined the discussion regarding the constitutional origins of the discipline. 
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Gary Wamsley writes, “The way we define our founding makes all the 
difference in the way we view ourselves and our place in the political 
system, or the way we are viewed by others” (1990, p. 23). Brian Cook 
adds emphasis to the use of the Constitution in forging the origins of Public 
Administration: “I argue that bureaucracy derives its authority to rule from 
the Constitution and not from its presumed expertise in administration” 
(1992, p. 2). Larry Terry continues the conversation: “The primary function 
of bureaucratic leaders is to protect and maintain administrative 
institutions in a manner that promotes or is consistent with constitutional 
processes, values, and beliefs” (2003, p. 24). In a similar vein, Michael 
Spicer adds “To the extent that an active role in governance for public 
administration can be justified in a convincing fashion by the Constitution, 
the more likely it is that such a role will be seen as legitimate” (1995, p. 7). 
Finally, William Richardson believes that public administrators get “the 
necessary ballast to survive” in a thorough grounding of constitutional 
thought (1997, p. 128). Taken together, the Constitutional School within 
American Public Administration suggests that the Constitution legitimizes 
the administrative state as compatible with original 1787 thought, fulfilling 
its obligation to protect the individual rights of its citizens through 
administrative functions that are subordinate to stated powers within the 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches.  
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 If Wamsley is correct, our founding shapes our identity and our 
position in history. To link public administration to the founding secures 
legitimacy. But how do we know what “original 1787 thought” might have 
been? To think that political theory of the eighteenth century was whole 
and complete is to miss the importance of the history of ideas and the 
links between them. What are the origins of these ideas, from where do 
they emanate, and who were the players that brought the traditions 
forward? As Spicer notes, “as is well known, the founders did not invent 
the Constitution out of whole cloth. Rather, they drew their ideas from a 
tradition of political thought and practice that dated back, at the very 
least, to seventeenth century England” (2004a, p. 566).  
 One eighteenth-century philosopher/historian who deserves 
reexamination for her contribution to political thought is Catharine 
Macaulay. American intellectual historians have documented 
Macaulay’s influence upon our eighteenth-century Founding Fathers, 
specifically in regard to a republican movement away from monarchy. 
Does Macaulay’s History and philosophy offer lessons for public 
administration as well? This dissertation attempts to create a model of 
public administration based upon Macaulay’s vision of governance as 
described in her history of seventeenth-century England. Looking beyond 
the Founders to earlier English thought as narrated by Macaulay, this 
dissertation will examine her version of the roots of republic ideology 
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emanating from the time of the English Civil Wars. This dissertation will 
endeavor, through her vision of governance, to develop a model of 
administration that answers questions debated within public 
administration today. This model becomes useful as a means of providing 
a fresh perspective on contemporary public administration thought. Does 
Macaulay offer a vision equivalent to or different from debates within the 
field today, such as the classical orthodoxy of Wilson and Gulick, the New 
Public Management, the Citizen Participation school of thought, and 
even Rohr’s Constitutional School? Using Macaulay’s works as the 
medium, this dissertation will examine primary sources offered through 
Macaulay’s writings, correspondence, and published materials. Her 
writings will be interpreted by comparison to current public administration 
thinking. The data for research purposes will be her writings, including 
books, pamphlets, and correspondence with American friends.  
 
CATHARINE SAWBRIDGE MACAULAY GRAHAM (1731 – 1791) 
Born in Kent in 1731, Catharine Sawbridge was the granddaughter 
of a survivor of the South Sea Bubble, whose fortune was salvaged thanks 
to the intervention of the Whig Party. An autodidact, she read history and 
philosophy in her father’s library, displaying an unusual independence 
and self-sufficiency remarkable for a girl in the eighteenth century. 
Macaulay attributed her republican politics to the early reading of 
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ancient texts, especially “those histories which exhibit liberty in its most 
exalted state in the annuals of the Roman and Greek Republics, studies 
like these excite the natural love of freedom which lies latent in the breast 
of every rational being, till it is nipped by the frost of prejudice or blasted 
by the influence of vice” (Macaulay, 1763, p. i). In an unusually late event 
for the times, she married, at the age of twenty-nine, a Scottish physician, 
George Macaulay, who encouraged her to write. Through her friendship 
with philanthropist and collector Thomas Hollis, Macaulay was able to 
acquire and read original pamphlets and primary sources made possible 
by the free speech and free press movement during the English Civil Wars. 
Macaulay was also among the first researchers to utilize the resources of 
the British Museum, perusing original artifacts such as diaries, journals, and 
handwritten notes. Among the many scholars examining Macaulay’s 
works (Hill, 1992, Hay, 1994, Hicks, 2002) all agree that her use of primary 
sources such as original manuscripts and political tracts was unique to 
historians of the time. As one of the first serious historians to use the 
collection of the newly opened British Museum (1759), Macaulay had 
access to, and read, thousands of pages of treatises, diaries, and earlier 
histories of the seventeenth century. The history of Parliament, maintained 
in the Journals of the Commons and Parliamentary History are repeatedly 
cited throughout her books. So well footnoted are the early editions of The 
History that she was criticized for providing too much detail and later 
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editions are less comprehensive in the use of citations. Several volumes of 
her History included an index of the legislation enacted by Parliament 
during the period of which she wrote. Irrespective of the criticism, 
Macaulay read, catalogued, and digested these historical documents 
(noted in her 1790 document A Catalogue of Tracts, Hill, 1992, p. 48) and 
became ideally situated to hypothesize about the function and role of 
government. 
Using all these resources, she wrote a 3,500 page, 8-volume history, 
The History of England from the Accession of James I to that of the 
Brunswick Line, first published in 1763 with the final volume published 
twenty years later. Considered Macaulay’s magnum opus, it is a 
passionate account of the Stuart monarchy that vividly describes the 
conditions existing at the time of the English Civil Wars; the contributions of 
Harrington and Milton under Cromwell; the restoration of the throne to 
James II; the works of Sidney, Neville, and Locke in expanding republican 
ideology; and ends with an impassioned account of the extension of 
liberty through the shared powers established between the monarch and 
Parliament during the Glorious Revolution. Contrary to David Hume’s 
classic Tory account of the same period, Macaulay was an advocate for 
a republic, a government that relied more on the people than on a king.  
 Macaulay’s additional works include a rejoinder to Thomas 
Hobbes’s comments on government and society entitled, Loose Remarks 
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on Certain Positions to be found in Mr. Hobbes’s ‘Philosophical Rudiments 
of Government and Society’, with a Short Sketch of a Democratical Form 
of Government, In a Letter to Signor Paoli, (1767); a criticism of Edmund 
Burke’s support for political parties, Observations on a Pamphlet entitled 
‘Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents’, (1770); a proposal for 
a new copyright law, A Modest Plea for the Property of Copyright, (1774); 
a pamphlet supporting the American colonies prior to the start of the 
Revolutionary War, An Address to the People of England, Scotland, and 
Ireland on the Present Important Crisis of Affairs, (1775);  and another 
critical retort to Burke, Observations on the Reflections of the Rt. Hon. 
Edmund Burke, on the Revolution in France (1790). In addition to the 
History, Macaulay wrote three books, including a philosophical 
examination of the nature of God in A Treatise on the Immutability of 
Moral Truth (1783), a shortened version of her eight-volume history in The 
History of England from the Revolution to the Present Times in a Series of 
Letters to a Friend (1778), and a popular book reprinted in 1974 titled 
Letters on Education with Observations on Religious and Metaphysical 
Subjects (1790), a work cited by Mary Wollstonecraft for its contribution to 
the advancement of women.  Wollstonecraft referred to Macaulay as 
“the woman of greatest abilities whom England has yet produced” 
(Wollstonecraft, 1790, afterwords). 
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 Macaulay’s popularity as “the historian in petticoats” and the 
“republican virago” brought her celebrity, wealth, and attention. She was 
widowed after six years of marriage yet she opened a salon in her home, 
attended by her Member of Parliament brother, who represented one of 
the boroughs of London, his Radical Whig friends, and visiting colonists 
from America. Josiah Quincy called her home “a club of liberty” (Hill, 
1992, p. 185). Radical Whig ideas were the conversation of the day, with 
discussions focused on republican values such as rule by elected 
representatives and controls on corruption. Other visiting Americans 
included James Otis and Benjamin Rush who sent copies of her History 
home. In a letter to Macaulay, Rush noted, “Your views terminate not in 
the happiness of individuals but of nations, and of nations who are to live 
centuries hence” (Donnelly, 1949, p. 181). Thomas Jefferson purchased 
two sets of the History - one for donation to the University of Virginia and 
another for his private library. She was the historian “whom Washington 
knew best” (Colbourn, 1965, pp. 153-54). Macaulay was claimed ‘among 
the patriots’ best English friends’ and ‘an important intellectual figure of 
this generation to the colonists’ (Bailyn, 1967, p. 41). John Adams liked the 
eighteenth century temper of Macaulay, and read her History with 
approbation, noting that she was able “to strip off the gilding and false 
luster from worthless princes and nobles, and to bestow the reward of 
virtue, praise, upon the generous and worthy only” (Colbourn, 1965, p. 86). 
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Macaulay and Adams corresponded throughout their lives and met in 
London while Adams served as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. She 
met Benjamin Franklin while traveling in Paris and he in turn visited her 
salon when in London. He compared her History to that of Robertson and 
Livy.  
 Upon the conclusion of the American Revolution, Macaulay, now 
married to William Graham, traveled to America to visit with old friends 
maintained via correspondence before and after the war. Her cadre of 
friends included both ardent Federalists such as Adams and equally 
fervent Anti-Federalists such as Mercy Otis Warren. Her one-year visit 
included stops in Boston to meet Samuel Adams, a stay in New York to 
meet with Richard Henry Lee and Rufus King, excursions to Philadelphia 
and Baltimore where she met other delegates to the Continental 
Congress, and she concluded her journey with a ten-day stay at Mt. 
Vernon, as the guest of George and Martha Washington. After her 
departure, Washington wrote to Lee, “I am obliged to you for introducing 
a lady to me whose reputation among the literati is so high, and whose 
principles are so much and so justly admired by the friends of liberty and 
mankind – it gave me pleasure to find that her sentiments respecting the 
inadequacy of the powers of Congress as also those of Dr. Price 
coincided with my own” (Donnelly, 1949, p. 195). She corresponded with 
Washington and others until her death in 1791. 
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IMPORTANCE OF MACAULAY’S WRITINGS TO AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
THOUGHT    
In order to appreciate the importance of Macaulay’s writings for 
America’s political thinking, it is helpful to understand the relationship 
between American and English political ideas. Intellectual historians of the 
American Revolution trace the origins of American political thought to 
seventeenth-century England. Pauline Maier (1972) demonstrates the 
development in colonial thought: 
 
The colonists’ attitudes toward civil uprisings were part of a 
broader Anglo-American political tradition. In the course of 
the eighteenth century, colonists became increasingly 
interested in the ideas of seventeenth-century English 
revolutionaries such as John Milton, Algernon Sidney, John 
Locke, and the later writers who carried on and developed 
this tradition – Robert Molesworth; John, Lord Somers; the 
Anglican bishop Benjamin Hoadly; John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon, whose essays, published together as Cato’s 
Letters, were a classic for many Americans; the Scottish 
philosopher Francis Hutcheson; and the celebrated English 
historian of the 1760’s and 1770’s Catharine Macaulay. By the 
1760’s, this ‘Real Whig’ or ‘Commonwealthman’ tradition 
provided a strong unifying element between colonists North 
and South (1972, p. 27). 
 
For Americans raised in the belief that their ancestry was English, it is 
not surprising that they were eager to learn their own history. According to 
Trevor Colbourn, who traced the impact of Whig history and the origins of 
the American Revolution, “The more history a colonist read the more 
Whigs he inevitably encountered, not only because of their weight or 
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numbers but also because of their popularity and productivity” (1965, p. 
10). Colbourn traces copies of Macaulay’s History, for example, to the 
libraries of Adams, Benjamin Rush, Jefferson, John Mackenzie, Henry Knox, 
numerous booksellers along the Atlantic Coast and the university libraries 
at Harvard and Yale, Rhode Island College, and Franklin’s public library in 
Philadelphia.  
The transmission and development of Whig political ideology is best 
captured in Caroline Robbins’ The Eighteenth Century 
Commonwealthman. Robbins chronicles these partisan beliefs through 
the works of writers such as Neville, Harrington, Sidney, Ludlow, and Locke, 
recognizing the importance of civic virtue and political participation, the 
dangers of corruption, the importance of the rule of law, and restraints on 
arbitrary power. “Their continued existence and activity, albeit of a limited 
kind, served to maintain a revolutionary tradition and to link the histories of 
English struggles against tyranny in one century with those of American 
efforts for independence in another” (Robbins, 1987, pp. 1-2). Robbins 
further states “The Commonwealthmen could be regarded as the 
conservators of the older order; they must also be seen as the spiritual 
heirs and ancestors of revolutionaries everywhere” (1987, p. 3). 
Bernard Bailyn uses Robbins’ Commonwealthmen as the starting point for 
his assessment of the move toward American independence and argues: 
This distinctive influence has been transmitted most directly to 
the colonists by a group of early eighteenth-century radical 
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publicists and opposition politicians of early eighteenth 
century England who carried forward into the eighteenth 
century and applied to the politics of the age of Walpole the 
peculiar strain of anti-authoritarianism bred in the upheaval of 
the English Civil War (1967, p. xii).  
 
Bailyn traces the origins of American political thought prior to the 
Revolution by examining the various lines of public opinion and belief as 
published in pamphlets, newspapers, and sermons. In his view, “The 
ultimate origins of this distinctive ideological strain lay in the radical social 
and political thought of the English Civil War and of the Commonwealth 
period; but its permanent form had been acquired at the turn of the 
seventeenth century and in the early eighteenth century, in the writings of 
a group of prolific opposition theorists, ‘country’ politicians and publicists” 
(Bailyn, 1967, p. 34). Bailyn summarizes the importance of these writers, 
noting, “More than any other single group of writers they shaped the mind 
of the American Revolutionary generation” (1967, p. 35). 
Both Bailyn and Robbins view Macaulay as important among these 
writers, keeping alive the belief in natural rights, the heroic efforts to 
protect liberty, and the heritage of the rule of law despite a corrupt 
monarchical system. Robbins places Macaulay in the category of pro-
Americans, those writers and thinkers who worked for Parliamentary relief 
from the Stamp and Townsend Acts and whose efforts influenced a 
generation of American activists.   
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Furthermore, for Robbins, the Commonwealthmen influence did not 
end with the Revolution, but continued into the constitutional debates: 
“anyone reading the debates in Philadelphia in 1787 or some of the 
radical literature of the nineteenth century will discover an echo of the 
work of the Commonwealthmen” (1987, p. xiii). It was in America that the 
ideas of these English Radical Whigs bore fruit. While wishing to reform the 
English government, it was instead the American Constitution that 
reflected their ideology - as in a separation of church and state, a 
balance of powers within the organization of government, and electoral 
requirements for a rotation in office.  
In light of the influence of these Whig writers on the opinions of men 
we have come to call the Founders, Macaulay’s place among these 
writers deserves closer examination. Her comments concerning leadership 
and government are as germane today as when she wrote them three 
centuries ago. Although the language and rhetoric of Macaulay’s works 
may be more baroque than that to which the modern reader is 
accustomed, its vivid and passionate portrayal of the hazards of 
corruption, calumny, and vice speaks clearly to the student of public 
administration. One reviewer called her style “anecdotal, not 
unpicturesque, emphatic, and full of lively invective” (Hobman, 1952, p. 
121). For Macaulay, a good republican was the civic-minded citizen 
educated in virtue who became a prime contributor to a good society. 
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Power was not to be held by an absolute monarch, but to be shared 
within the legislature and protected by a series of checks and balances. 
The rule of law was paramount and legal precedent was used to justify 
regicide as well as restrain executive privilege. Suffrage was extended to 
men of both wealth and menial holdings, while restrictions were placed 
upon length of service, residence within the voting district, and the 
selection of Cabinet officers. Education in morals and virtues was the key 
to creating a good citizen. Macaulay was a champion of the rights of 
man to assert his liberty in the face of oppression and corruption. The 
promotion and protection of liberty was the summa bonum of 
government. 
 This dissertation endeavors, using the works of Catharine Macaulay, 
to follow the patterns set by Robbins, Bailyn, and others regarding the 
history of ideas. In this particular instance, it will trace the history of liberal 
and republican thought as represented in the tenets of the US Constitution 
and the foundations of public administration. Further, based upon that 
trace evidence, it will shape a vision of a form of government as 
espoused by Macaulay. Finally, it will use that vision of government to 
create a conceptual model of public administration suitable for 
comparison to contemporary models of public administration. The 
dissertation will conclude with remarks regarding lessons learned from 
eighteenth-century political thought that may be applicable to 
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contemporary thinking. Specifically, with respect to public administration 
scholars, the dissertation provides an alternative, enriched interpretation 
for the Constitutional School to use as it examines its origins.  
 
STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 Given that this dissertation is examining the writings of Catharine 
Macaulay, through analysis of her History, pamphlets, letters, and private 
correspondence for application to American Public Administration, the 
principal research questions to be addressed are: 
Research Question One: What is the conceptual vision of government 
that Macaulay expresses through her writings? 
Research Question Two: What sort of model of public administration is 
implied in this vision? 
Research Question Three: How does this model of public administration 
compare and contrast with contemporary models of public 
administration? 
 In seeking to answer the research questions, this dissertation will 
examine Macaulay’s beliefs pertaining to the nature of man; Macaulay’s 
perspective on freedom as grounded in the rule of law; commentary on 
the separation of powers gleaned from her perspective on the differences 
between the Parliament and the king contrasted with her comments on 
the American Congress and the president; and finally her precepts on 
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democracy, including expansion of the franchise, elections, education, 
and representation.  Choosing these particular subjects for study provides 
a lens into Macaulay’s perspective on government, society, and man’s 
place within the context of government and society. Her History guides 
the reader toward an understanding of the importance of the rule of law 
and separation of powers. Macaulay’s Letters on Education provides a 
characterization as well as her clear impression of the nature of man that 
is further developed in The Immutability of Moral Truth. By studying her 
published pamphlets and private correspondence the reader can 
interpret Macaulay’s rules for running a government and appreciate her 
concepts of democracy. The corpus of Macaulay’s work provides two 
important opportunities for the researcher: 1) a vision of her concept of 
government, and 2) a model of public administration suitable for 
examination, analysis, and comparison to contemporary thought.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 This dissertation seeks to connect the ideas of Catharine Macaulay 
to present day American Public Administration. As such, it is an 
examination of a part of the history of ideas. The study of a history of ideas 
traces thoughts, beliefs, and concepts within the particular human 
practices in which they emerged and developed. Roger Hausheer has 
described a history of ideas as “an attempt to trace the birth and 
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development of some of the ruling concepts of a civilization or culture 
through long periods of mental change, and to reconstruct the image 
men have of themselves and their activities, in a given age and culture” 
(1982, p. xvii). Intellectual historians offer new facts and details through 
their chronicles of past events, opening new interpretations and 
perspectives that come through analysis and insight, typically from 
philosophers attempting to make sense of the human experience. Thus, 
tracing the origins of ideas such as liberty, the rule of law, and universal 
suffrage through historical analysis creates a richer argument for who we 
are as people, how we came to be governed in the fashion we have, 
and how we embrace core values such as justice and freedom. 
 The concept of the history of ideas comes from the philosophical 
pursuit of inquiry. Questions such as “Why must I obey?”, “Who should 
rule?”, and “Where do public administrators get the authority to govern in 
a democratic republic?” have been asked in various forms since the time 
of the ancient Greeks. As Isaiah Berlin notes, “Philosophical questions 
continued (and continue) to fascinate and torment inquiring minds” and 
“Men cannot live without seeking to describe and explain the universe to 
themselves” (1979, pp. 7, 10). Spicer (2005, p. 672) describes the history of 
ideas as making sense of human experience, with political philosophy 
including those aspects concerned with politics and governance. 
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 Sheldon Wolin points out the importance of combining philosophy 
and history in a history of ideas: 
Here lies the vocation of these who preserve our 
understanding of past theories, who sharpen our sense of the 
subtle, complex interplay between our political experience 
and thought, and who preserve our memory of the agonizing 
efforts of intellect to restate the possibilities and threats posed 
by political dilemmas of the past. In teaching about past 
theories, the historically-minded theorist is engaged in the task 
of political initiation; that is, of introducing new generations of 
students to the complexities of politics and to the efforts of 
theorists to confront its predicaments (1960, p. 1077) 
 
How do we trace the history of ideas? There are no established rules 
or procedures to follow, no variables to add or delete, no interviews to 
conduct or words to count. Empirical methods and logical deductions 
dwell in another realm for the social scientist to use. As Berlin suggests: 
 
It is not only that we may not know the answers to (these) 
questions, but that we are not clear how to set about to 
answer them – where to look – what would constitute 
evidence for an answer and what would not… (W) e are 
puzzled from the outset, that there is no automatic technique, 
no universally recognized expertise, for dealing with such 
questions. We discover that we do not feel sure how to set 
about clearing our minds, finding out the truth, accepting or 
rejecting earlier answers to these questions. Neither induction 
(in its widest sense of scientific reasoning), nor direct 
observation (appropriate to empirical enquiries), nor 
deduction (demanded by formal problems) seems to be of 
help (1979, p. 146). 
 
 As one who draws upon the history of ideas in the context of public 
administration inquiry, Spicer has outlined the following approach: 
19 
 
In seeking to uncover the categories that we use in thinking 
about public administration and governance, we can draw 
upon three sources, namely, what people have said about 
these things, what they have written about these things, and 
how they have practiced these things. In other words, 
historians of ideas draw upon an examination of talk, at least 
as it has been recorded, considered writing, and practice 
(2005, p. 5). 
 
 Terence Ball compares a historian of political thought with an 
anthropologist studying an alien culture through the texts left behind: “Not 
only must the texts be read but also … we must interpret the meaning, for 
there is no understanding without interpretation, and no interpretation 
without the possibility of multiple (mis) understandings” (1995, p. 9). These 
interpretations by their very nature are value laden by the one 
conducting the interpretation. Ball continues by stating, “Political theory, 
more than any other vocation, takes its own past to be an essential part 
of its present” (1995, p. 29). 
 In synthesizing the remarks of Spicer and Ball, for purposes of this 
dissertation, pursuing a methodical approach to the history of ideas 
involves reading, interpreting, analyzing, reflecting, and comparing. The 
research first begins with a close reading of what Macaulay said and 
wrote within the context of the time she lived and studied. Macaulay 
wrote in the eighteenth century about the seventeenth century. Her use 
of the language, that is, words and their meaning, carry a different 
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significance from the vernacular we use today. Cultural and contextual 
care must be taken when interpreting the language. Forrest McDonald 
offers three guiding principles to students of the eighteenth century: 
 
First, one must pay close attention to the meanings of even 
the most ordinary words, for these have changed in myriad 
ways…The second principle is that one must seek out the 
‘buzz words’ or ‘code words’ that are identifiable with 
particular ideologies or bodies of thought…third …one must 
be cautious in bringing to bear concepts and information 
that were not available to the eighteenth-century subjects 
(McDonald, 1985, pp. xi –xii). 
 
 Second, passages pertaining to the three research questions will be 
chosen for examination. When Macaulay discusses the separation of 
powers, for example, is her intention one of limiting authority or of 
segregating jurisdiction? Who was her audience? What were her interests 
in making her argument? Is her argument logical or philosophical or both? 
Was there a specific target for her suggestions or is she an advocate of 
normative politics? 
 The third stage of the process involves reflection. It is needed, Wolin 
writes, “because the life of inquiry preeminently demands reflectiveness, 
that is, an indwelling or rumination in which the mind draws on the 
complex framework of sensibilities built up unpremeditatedly and calls 
upon the diverse resources of civilized knowledge” (1960, p. 1071). 
Reflection allows the mind to consider different interpretations when 
analyzing a text or document. The lens need not focus upon one 
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interpretation, but may offer for consideration alternatives in meaning, 
application, and purpose. As Berlin writes, “To think is to generalize, to 
generalize is to compare. To think of one phenomenon or cluster of 
phenomena is to think in terms of its resemblances to and differences from 
others” (1979, p. 75). 
 The final step in the process is a comparison of Macaulay’s thought 
to the discourse within public administration. If the history of ideas is a 
viable mode of enquiry and worthy of scholarly pursuit, then its product 
must add to the body of knowledge. What are the implications of an 
abusive and tyrannical executive who tries to destroy the legislature? 
What results when the rule of law is violated? How does the right to vote 
symbolize equality? Has the nature of man changed over time or have 
we gained insight into the moral and ethical composition of humans? An 
examination of these questions will attest to the importance of our 
historical heritage as a body of knowledge worthy of examination. 
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 Chapter two examines Macaulay’s belief system and attempts to 
define her view of human nature. Her vision of government cannot be 
discerned until one understands how she viewed man – as operating from 
a sense of goodness toward others or by contrast, instilled with ideas for 
self-promotion and self-aggrandizement. The chapter reviews her 
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conflicting thoughts regarding human nature, that is, man as perfectible 
in the image of God, or conversely, man as corrupt through greed and 
desire. It also examines the role of education in the development of the 
individual in society. 
 The third chapter begins the discussion of Macaulay’s conceptual 
vision of government emphasizing her liberal perspective, drawn from the 
darker side of her view of human nature. Her historical account of men in 
power evinced the power, seduction, and persuasion of corruption. For 
government to exist without those arbitrary influences required controls; as 
in an expansion of democracy, a separation of powers, and adherence 
to the rule of law. The chapter draws on such efforts from both 
Macaulay’s history and her pamphlets. Arguing from a liberal perspective, 
Macaulay drew on the works of Harrington, Locke, and Milton to frame 
her political ideology. 
 The fourth chapter examines Macaulay’s vision of government 
emphasizing her classical republican perspective. Lauded for her 
republican principles, Macaulay had a reverence for antiquity, a firm 
belief in civic virtue, and the desire for men of education to lead 
government. Based upon these values Macaulay defines a vision of 
governing in which men participate in government for the common 
good. Through her program of education, Macaulay believed that social 
and cultural reforms would bring forth political reforms as well. 
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Chapter five endeavors to merge Macaulay’s two disparate visions 
of governance into a model for public administration. Four major themes 
are considered for application to American public administration: first, the 
source of power; second, the role of public administration in checking 
power; third, the role of education in public administration; and fourth, the 
concept of benevolence. What can we infer from her vision of 
governance for purposes of administration? Who should rule? What are 
the requirements for governance? What should be the relationship 
between the administrator and the elected leader? What is the nature of 
administration? 
 The final chapter will review the central themes of the dissertation, 
weigh its implications for American public administration, and offer 
suggestions for further research. Macaulay was an iconoclast and 
forgotten shortly after her death. Her writings and political tracts deserve 
further examination in terms of their contribution to public administration 
theory. Macaulay’s personal correspondence with her American friends 
provides new insight into arguments over the nature of leadership and the 
role of the American Congress. Additionally, her lengthy correspondence 
with Mercy Otis Warren and John Adams offers new opportunities for study 
into the distinctions between Federalist and Anti-Federalist thought. Her 
extraordinary talent for capturing historical and personal anecdotes from 
the seventeenth century provides fresh perspective into the origins of 
24 
liberal and classical republican thought. Finally, Macaulay deserves to be 
included in the pantheon of eighteenth-century political philosophers as 














MACAULAY ON HUMAN NATURE: 
 
 CORRUPTIBLE OR PERFECTIBLE? 
 
 
 Throughout the greater part of her writing, most notably in the 
History of England (1763 – 1783), Catharine Macaulay portrayed human 
beings as selfish and prone to corruption. However, her final publication, 
Letters on Education (1790), spoke to the perfectibility of those same 
human beings as capable of becoming civic leaders through the 
practice of sympathy and benevolence. How did Macaulay develop two 
such disparate ideas about human nature? What caused Macaulay to 
spend the greater part of her career portraying man as greedy and 
desirous of emoluments while at the end of her life she envisioned man as 
noble and virtuous? As a historian and influential writer at the time of the 
founding of the American republic, Catharine Macaulay is worthy of 
examination as to her interpretation of the nature of man. What where her 
sympathies and inclinations regarding human nature? How did she view 
the behavior of humans in civil society? More to the point, how does a 
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Macaulayian interpretation of human nature assist in the practice of 
public administration? 
As is true of any political philosopher an understanding of 
Macaulay’s political philosophy requires an understanding of her views on 
human nature. The reader will find an emphasis on a darker side to 
Macaulay’s philosophy rendered evident through passages describing 
man’s inability to control his passions for power, wealth, and status. Her 
History of England resonated with stories of real people forsaking 
themselves for titles, tributes, and accolades. Yet Macaulay’s fame was 
made by her belief in man as a citizen of virtue, intent upon participating 
in society for the good of all, not selfish interest alone. She avoided luxury 
and moral depravity and saw both as contributing toward the eventual 
disintegration of civilization itself (Fox, 1968, p. 131). In portraits and statues 
she was depicted as the classical guardian of liberty and a bastion 
against vice. Her religious beliefs, grounded in millennialism (Withey, 1976, 
p. 59), led all people to a heavenly reward in return for a benevolent life 
devoted to service and moral goodness. How can these two disparate 
images of mankind be reconciled? Is ambiguity itself a characteristic of 
human nature? 
In investigating Macaulay’s works, clues she left behind help identify 
her inclinations regarding man’s corruptibility or perfectibility. For example, 
the emphasis she placed on her admiration for Greek and Roman history 
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helps characterize her views of civic virtue. At the same time, her strong 
desire for controls on executive power helps depict her fears of 
corruption. She openly acknowledged throughout her writings the 
influence she received from Locke in the formation of her political 
philosophy, yet it is hard to escape her belief in the role of active 
citizenship. It is her inclination toward one belief or another that influences 
her contribution to public administration theory. For as Herbert Finer noted, 
“What we are interested in knowing is, what gods and demons possessed 
these men to take the sides they did. For what men say in justification of 
their private selves is an infallible index to their public policies” (1926, p. 
340).  
Therefore, this chapter examines the writing and philosophy of 
Catharine Macaulay as it pertains to human nature. Two themes will be 
developed which are drawn from her writing: the idea of man as a 
corrupt being who must be restrained within civil society and the idea of 
man as perfectible and able to govern through disinterested virtue.  
 
HUMAN NATURE AS CORRUPT 
Corruption due to desire, manipulation, and exploitation of power 
were major themes in Macaulay’s eight-volume History and it was 
corruption that was the motivating factor for many of the major players 
who made history. Her writing was replete with the foibles and gaffes man 
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made in attempting to rule, for “The love of filthy lucre, or the cravings of 
nature, will sometimes prevail, even over the refinements of genius and 
science” (1774, p. 14). History was not a repetition of facts that took place 
in a bygone era; for Macaulay it was the study of the moral authority 
displayed by its leading characters. History was made based upon the 
ethical orientation of England’s leaders, or the lack thereof, and the 
purpose she noted for writing history was to show how the actions of men 
had curtailed the civil rights of England. She told her readers:  
 
This nation has ever produced a number of bad citizens, who, 
prone to be corrupted, have been the ready tools of wicked 
ministers, and the zealous partisans in a cause big with the 
ruin of the state, and the destruction of that felicity which the 
individuals of this country have for some years enjoyed (1763, 
pp. ix – xi).  
  
Macaulay described how those wicked ministers and zealous 
partisans would lose Liberty, which was so dear to her:  
 
Whoever attempts to remove the limitations necessary to 
render monarchy consistent with Liberty, are rebels in the 
worst sense; rebels to the laws of their country, the law of 
nature, the law of reason, and the law of God (1763, p. xi). 
 
 As such, the introduction to her first volume of history began with a 
lament for the heroes of the Commonwealth who championed the cause 
of liberty and defended the rights of Englishmen. Macaulay wrote: 
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Corruption, that undermining mischief, has sapped the 
foundation of a fabric, whose building was cemented with 
the blood of our best citizens. The growing evil has spread far 
and wide, tainted the minds of men with such an incurable 
degeneracy, that the virtue of our forefathers is become the 
ridicule of every modern politician… It is become an 
established maxim, that corruption is a necessary engine of 
government. How opposite this is to the genius and spirit of 
our constitution, is too apparent to need a proof. That the 
consequences of it are already severely felt in this country, 
our debts and heavy taxes fatally demonstrate. This is a sad 
but certain truth, that corruption is so general among us that 
it has dissolved the sacred bonds of mutual trust (1763, xix-xx). 
 
 
Macaulay feared that during her lifetime, corruption in government had 
become the modus operandi. She wrote: 
 
By the influences of bribery, every man in these days has a 
triple temptation to sin against his own country: The 
emoluments of favor; the fear of being laughed at for his 
honesty; of being abandoned by his associates, and left 
single to stand the insults of a victorious faction (1763, p. xxi). 
 
 From her writing of history, Macaulay understood too well the lure of 
power, the avarice and greed associated with it, and the repercussions 
that resulted from its abuses. She amply documented the history of 
selfishness by the ruling elite and wrote the story of history as an 
opportunity lost, of mismanaged prospects for change. As one reviewer 
wrote: “Hers is a chronicle of opportunities missed or deliberately ignored, 
of a few villains and rather more weak men and women” (Schnorrenberg, 
1990, p. 234). Pocock described her purpose behind writing history: 
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Histories are written in order to praise the memory and hold 
up the example of those who have public virtue; that this 
must be done because any republic contains many – 
normally including the ignorant vulgar or multitude – who 
cannot be trusted to maintain virtue, as well as the morally 
weak who will probably, and the wicked who will certainly, 
betray it” (1998, p. 247). 
 
 
Macaulay provided many illustrations of man’s frailty regarding 
corrupting influences. First, she believed that God endowed men with 
varying degrees of “judgment, understanding, sagacity, genius, and 
industry” (1768, p. 355). Thus, depending upon the individual, these 
qualities created stronger or weaker personalities able to face the 
temptations of power. For example, some men supported monarchy as a 
way to garner fame, and they willingly abused their situation for personal 
honor, as she explained:  
 
To show the causes of so great a malignancy it will be 
necessary to observe, that there are in every society a 
number of men to whom tyranny is in some measure 
profitable; men devoid of every virtue and qualification 
requisite to rise in a free state: The emoluments and favors 
they gain for supporting tyranny are the only means by which 
they can obtain distinctions; which, in every equal 
government are the rewards of public service. The selfish 
affections of these men, exalted above worthier citizens, 
fancy a recompense in this exaltation ample enough for the 
sacrifice of their Liberty. To avoid the censures of injured 
posterity, their children are brought up in the doctrine of 
necessary servitude, and are taught to regard the champions 
of Liberty as the disturbers of the peace of mankind. Hence is 
produced a numerous class of men, who having been 
educated in the principles of slavery, become the deluded 
instruments of all the villainous purposes of mean ambition 
(1763, p. xii - xiii). 
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Other men shamelessly sought personal financial reward, as when William 
II imported financial schemes from the Dutch: 
 
The pernicious practice of borrowing upon remote funds 
necessarily produced a brood of usurers, brokers, and stock-
jobbers, who preyed upon the vitals of their country; and from 
this fruitful source, venality overspread the land; corruption, 
which under the government of bad Princes had maintained 
a partial influence in the administration of public affairs, from 
the period of the revolution, was gradually formed into a 
system, and instead of being regarded with abhorrence, and 
severely punished, as in former times, received the 
countenance of the whole legislature; and every individual 
began openly to buy and sell his interest in his country, 
without either the fear of shame or penalty (1778, pp. 82-83). 
 
Worse, some men sacrificed their virtue for the rewards of pensions or 
titles, as she described: 
 
We should not have to lament so many melancholy instances 
of human weakness, nor, particularly in this country, such a 
continued succession of patriots falling from the highest 
pinnacle of reputation into the pit of shame and infamy, and 
sacrificing the essential superiorities of virtue and honor to the 
fancied distinctions of a peerage and a ribbon! (1765, p. 218) 
 
One egregious example, which occurred in her lifetime, was 
George II’s confirmation of a title on former Prime Minister Robert Walpole, 
despite the accusations of corruption against him. In a move to save him 
from prosecution, a deal was contrived in which several Members of 
Parliament would be elevated along with Walpole. Macaulay was aghast 
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at the ease by which men so easily succumbed to avarice rather than 
stand for justice: 
 
The bringing a minister to justice, taxed with flagrant acts of 
corruption, was the point on which the future of good 
government of the nation evidently depended; but the bait, 
it seems, was too tempting for modern patriotism to 
withstand…Mr. Sandys was appointed a Lord of the Treasury, 
with the office of Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord 
Harrington was gratified with the title of Earl, and declared 
President of the State; the Duke of Argyle, Master General of 
the Ordnance, Colonel of the Royal Regiment of Horse 
Guards, and Field Marshall and Commander in Chief of all 
the Forces in South Britain….and Robert Walpole became the 
Earl of Orford (1778, p. 419 - 421). 
 
 Not just Kings had the influences of corruption at hand. Macaulay 
noted that Parliament, at the time of the Commonwealth, was ready to 
abuse its power: 
  
That in the hands of the members of Parliament were lodged 
all the considerable commands of the army, and all the 
profitable offices in the civil administration…and there was no 
end to the war as long as people could enrich themselves by 
the calamities of the public (1768, p. 155). 
 
Nor was it merely the English for whom Macaulay worried about 
corruption; in a letter to Samuel Adams shortly before her death she 
expressed her fears about the American Congress: 
 
The Americans have a little too much of the leaven of their 
ancestors in them. They appear to have their wishes and 
desires more to the acquiring of gain than the enjoyment of 
personal liberty and to have entertained their mischievous 
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opinion that the felicity of Nations depend on their riches. 
They have also I think been guilty of a dangerous error in the 
not instructing the Members of their Congress from the 
enjoyment of those lucrative offices established by their 
authority and they may become the source of reprehension 
and the foundation of autocratic wealth and ambition (C. 
Macaulay, personal communication, March 1791). 
 
It was the people with whom Macaulay sympathized, for they were 
the ones who suffered from abuse. She documented several instances 
during the reign of William and Mary in which the people were dupes: 
 
The villainy of defrauding the public of every kind of contract 
or office was so complicated and general, that a commission 
for receiving and examining the public accounts had been 
granted in both the reigns without effect. Thus, through the 
heat of party, and the lucre of private gain, the public was 
always defrauded of that justice which is due from every kind 
of government to the people (1778, p. 101). 
 
During the reign of Queen Anne, shipping merchants, as Macaulay 
described, were also victimized: 
 
In consequence of a petition from the merchants, a 
committee of examination was appointed; the merchants 
were required to prove all their complaints by witness on 
oath; and in the prosecution of the business it appeared, that 
ships of war which had been fitted out to put to sea, were 
suffered to decay in the ports; that cruisers were not ordered 
to proper places in the channel; that convoys had been 
often flatly denied the merchants, and that when they were 
promised, they were so long delayed that the merchants lost 




 Corruption was more than securing wealth and advantage for 
personal gain. Corruption enabled the abuse of power and once in 
charge, corruption was used to maintain the control of power. For 
example, elections were bought and sold as easily as cattle in the market 
place. Macaulay wrote: 
 
The pernicious custom of bribery in elections, which began at 
the latter end of the reign of Charles the Second, and which 
had increased with a rapid progress since the revolution, 
began now to be generally practiced: tories and whigs, 
placemen and patriots, in defiance of the law, justice, and 
common decency, openly and avowedly out-bid each 
other, and bought votes as men would buy cattle in a 
common market (1778, p. 53). 
 
Political factions were frequent targets of Macaulay’s 
observations: 
The corruption of the tories arises from the badness of their 
hearts, and from thence infect their understanding. This 
political sect may justly be termed idol worshippers; they 
make a deity of human power, and expect particular 
benefits for their servile offerings (1778, p. 31). 
 
 
Without an honest government to represent them, how were the 
people to respond? 
 
When government is corrupt, people have no remedy: While 
the representatives of the people act on the principles of 
constitutional equity, the people have a legal resource 
against all abuses in the administration of the government; 
but when the government is corrupt, and tainted in its 
popular part, the people have no remedy but an appeal by 
the sword, or a resource to the dangerous shelter which the  
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prerogative affords (1778, p. 130). 
 
 
 This theme of corruption pervaded Macaulay’s one hundred and 
seventy-year long saga known as The History of England. Kings practiced 
corruption for political gain, members of the aristocracy used it for 
personal wealth, and she feared corruption was been bred into the new 
American Congress. Yet, according to Wood, “Classical republican values 
forbade it” (1991, p. 104). Citizens were to “sacrifice their private interests 
for the sake of the community, including service in public office without 
pecuniary rewards” (1991, p. 104). That high ideal was rarely manifested in 
the characters that made an appearance throughout Macaulay’s history. 
 
HUMAN NATURE AS PERFECTIBLE 
 
 Toward the end of her life Macaulay turned from history and 
political rhetoric to writing a book on education. She opined that if reason 
was the means by which men and women achieved perfection, then 
education was vital in developing that reason. Her biographer, Hill wrote:  
 
Her Letters on Education range over a wide variety of 
subjects; nursing and infant care, the upbringing, training, 
and education of children; slavery, capital punishment, and 
public executions, the need for improved care of prisoners 
and the better management of prisons; the importance of 
personal cleanliness, the treatment of animals, and the 
conditions of slaughter-houses. The diversity of contents may 
reflect awareness that time was running out for her. She 
wanted to express her ideas on a host of questions before it 
was too late (1992, p. 158). 
36 
 The book was written in the epistolary form, a style popular toward 
the end of the eighteenth century. Written as a series of letters to her 
friend Hortensia (Hortensia being eponymous of a Roman senator’s wife 
who asked for political power and social change for women), the book 
was divided into three parts: 1) the practical application of an 
educational system complete with a curriculum from infancy to the age 
of twenty-three; 2) a review of ancient Sparta, Athens, and Rome with 
details as to their defects and successes for application to modern 
civilization; and 3) a reiteration of an earlier work titled A Treatise on the 
Immutability of Moral Truth in which she provided her interpretation of 
God and the perfect benevolence that comes from nature. The book 
covered “a bewildering variety of ideas but the thrust was an educational 
one” (Hill, p. 160). At times, Macaulay compared her theories of 
education to those of Jean Jacques Rousseau’s Emile, published in 1762. 
She differed from his theory of sex-complementarity in which he 
suggested that woman was subservient to man and should be educated 
accordingly. Regardless of gender, Macaulay believed that human 
minds, male or female, were equal in essence and should be educated 
toward perfection. 
Explaining her religious philosophy in the latter part of the book, 
Macaulay wrote that humans are perfectible because they reflected the 
divine Mind. Referring to the Stoics, she explained, “It was a principle of 
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the ancients that nothing can be made out of nothing… [And the 
ancients] placed man in an equal rank with the first principle of nature, by 
supposing him an immediate emanation from the Deity” (1790a, p. 430).  
Macaulay envisioned God as the Divine Mind, whose absolute 
omnipotence (p. 353), perfect benevolence (p. 359), perfect wisdom (p. 
362), and perfection in justice (p. 366) would admit all believers into a 
heavenly afterlife. She compared God “to the tenderness of an earthly 
parent” (p. 5) whose power was equaled by his benevolence. Connie 
Titone described Macaulay’s God as, “an unembodied, omnipotently 
benevolent divine Mind, a virtuous divine Mind that creates a potentially 
virtuous humanity (Titone, 2004, p. 40). 
Yet despite human reflection of an omnipotent, benevolent, and 
just Being, humans have not obtained perfection. Why? Macaulay stated, 
“God has made man capable at arriving at a high degree of perfection; 
but that the progress we make to excellence must be slow, as it solely 
depends on experience, and is liable to interruption from ignorance and 
passion” (1790a. p. 186). 
Macaulay asked:  
 
If the benevolence of God extends equally to all his 
creatures, why is instinct sufficiently strong in the brute to 
prevent his falling into any evil which is not brought upon him 
by external force; and why is reason so impotent in man as to 
render him almost on every occasion the author of his own 
misery? (1790a, p. 7) 
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It is only through the use of reason, Macaulay believed, through 
practice and education, that humans could rise above instinct. To 
experience perfection and thus happiness, the human mind must be 
disciplined, educated, virtuous, and able to think critically. Impediments 
within the human mind, e.g., ignorance and selfishness, prevented 
humans from reaching the goal. Echoing Plato, Macaulay realized the 
difficulty of using the power of reason when she stated: 
 
It must be acknowledged then, that the gift of reason and 
the powers of imagination have indeed made a fatal havoc 
on human happiness….It is true that from the creation, men 
have generally exercised their powers in such a manner as to 
occasion much misery in this world to the far greater number 
of the species, and to cloud their hopes in the futurity (1790a, 
pp. 9 – 10).  
 
Macaulay continued, “It is a barbarous ignorance which has 
defrauded man of the means which he enjoys from his reasoning powers” 
(1790a, p. 12). The true nature of man is therefore unknown because of 
blunders, mistakes, and failure to reason effectively. It was the inability of 
people to reason closely and adequately upon abstract subjects that 
reinforced known prejudices and opinions. Macaulay’s perception of 
public opinion was keen: “It is a long time before the crowd give up 
opinions they have been taught to look upon with respect” (1790a, p. 
203) and “Opinions taken up on mere authority, must ever prevent original 
thinking, must stop the progress of improvement, and instead of 
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producing rational agents, can only make man the mere ape of man” 
(1790a, p. 127). She believed that education must be tied to reason or it is 
nothing more than opinion, as she stated:  “Learning must be united to 
judgment, penetration, and sagacity or it becomes a magazine of 
opinions from which error is oftener produced than truth” (1790a, p. 104). 
 The road to perfection was slow because reason had to transform 
the consciousness of thinking, specifically with regards to gender. It is 
within the second part of Letters on Education that Macaulay advocated 
equal education for men and women. She argued that the differences 
between the sexes “originate in situation and education only” and that 
from birth women are corrupted and debilitated in the powers of the 
mind and body, including a fixation on false notions of beauty and 
delicacy (p. 207), coquetry (p. 210), and vanity (p. 211). She reasoned: 
 
That there is but one rule of right for the conduct of all rational 
beings; consequently that true virtue in one sex must be 
equally so in the other, whenever a proper opportunity calls 
for its exertion; and vice versa, what is vice in one sex, cannot 
have a different property when found in another (1790a, p. 
201). 
 
Until both men and women reach equality there cannot be perfection – 
she wrote, “The happiness and perfection of the two sexes are so 
reciprocally dependent on one another that, till both are reformed, there 
is no expecting excellence in either. Till this is the case, we must endeavor 
to palliate the evil we cannot remedy” (1790a, p. 216). Historian Catharine 
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Gardner suggested that Macaulay’s view on gender reform opened a 
discussion on social reform. If men and women would understand the 
need for equality toward others, that equality would work toward the 
improvement of treatment toward women, children, and other classes 
(Gardner, 1998, p. 127). Regarding the issue of gender equality, Florence 
Boos wrote, “Other eighteenth and nineteenth century writers – 
Wollstonecraft, Thompson, Mill – championed the cause of women with 
greater fervor and effort, but Macaulay was unique in her categorical 
denial of innate sexual differences (1976, p. 65). 
Macaulay’s prescient view on gender extended to race as well. A 
well-known foe of slavery, she thought it the most savage atrocity of her 
time. She stated: 
 
Persons even of deep reflection have pretended to discover 
an apparent difference in the mental qualities of the 
inhabitants of the east and the north, and have given to the 
effect of climate those virtues which alone depend on moral 
causes. Others, with an audacity more blameable, have 
dared to tax the deity with partiality. They give to their own 
colour only, the quality of external beauty; and they 
persuade themselves, that the swarthy inhabitants of India 
and Africa are a degree below them in the scale of 
intelligent Nature (1790. p. 257). 
 
 For Macaulay, what we are and whether we are good or bad is not 
inherited or innate but is purely the effect of our environment (Gardner, 
1998, p. 122). Gender and racial equality were necessary in order to 
reflect the divine mind, and thus reach perfection and happiness. 
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According to Titone, who examined Macaulay’s philosophy of 
education for use in modern educational curricula, Macaulay’s belief in 
the perfectibility of the human mind can be summarized this way: 
 
The overarching, unarticulated argument threaded through 
all three parts and all five hundred pages of Letters on 
Education is summarized in the following propositions: God, 
the one perfect Mind, comprises elements of what have 
been called feminine and masculine characteristics, and 
therefore, properly speaking is a dual-gendered, or all-
gendered, or ultimately ungendered Being. Humankind is 
perfectible and has the capacity to reflect this divine unity, 
this totality of mind. To experience perfection, the human 
mind must first learn the clearest, most critical thinking, and 
the human being must express a virtuous character. 
Education, as she sees it, would prepare the human being to 
lead an individually virtuous life. In this state, humanity would 
understand and accept the added moral necessity of 
working toward the remediation of individual and social 




THE ROLE OF EDUCATION 
 
 To attain such a state of perfection required education and, 
according to Macaulay, this education had to be of a particular kind. 
Macaulay’s educational doctrine had three purposes: to prepare the 
human being for a life of virtue; through virtue come to an understanding 
of sympathetic benevolence; and through benevolence realize the 
equality of humankind and achieve the means of reaching perfection.
 References to Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 
appear in the introduction to Letters on Education. An understanding of 
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the mind is first in the establishment of a principled uniform system of 
education. She wrote: 
 
There is not a wretch who ends his miserable being on a 
wheel, as the forfeit of his offences against society, who may 
not throw the whole blame of his misdemeanors on his 
education; who may not look up to the very government, by 
whose severe laws he is made to suffer, as the author of his 
misfortunes; and who may not with justice utter the hardest 
imprecations on those to whom the charge of his youth was 
entrusted, and to those with whom he associated in the early 
periods of his life (1790a, pp. 11 – 12). 
 
 
If criminal behavior resulted from poor environmental conditions, not 
innate dispositions, then education and supervision were critical to a 
proper upbringing. Working from Locke’s Essay, Gardner asserted that 
Macaulay went further: People’s lack of knowledge of the principles of 
morality was the reason their “notions of right and wrong are loose, 
unconnected, and inconsistent’ (Macaulay, 1790a, p. 198). Without 
proper moral education, ‘even those who bear the specious title of 
philosophers are apt to be dazzled by the brilliancy of success, and to 
treat qualities and characters differently according to the smiles and 
frowns of fortune’ (1790a, p. 198-99) (Gardner, 1998, p. 124). 
Morals must be taught on unchangeable or immutable principles, 
according to Macaulay: 
 
It is one thing, Hortensia, to educate a citizen, and another to 
educate a philosopher. The mere citizen will have learnt to 
obey the laws of his country, but he will never understand 
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those principles on which all laws ought to be established; 
and without such an understanding, he can never be 
religious on rational principles, or truly moral; nor will he ever 
have any of that active wisdom which is necessary for co-
operation in any plan of reformation. But to teach morals on 
an immutable fitness, has never been the practice in any 
system of education yet extant. Hence all our notions of right 
and wrong are loose, unconnected, and inconsistent. Hence 
the murderer, in one situation, is extolled to the skies; and in 
another, is followed with reproach even beyond the grave 
(1790a, p. 198). 
 
 
According to Macaulay, it was the lack of a co-equal system of 
education that created the inequities between men and women,  “All 
those vices and imperfections which have been regarded as inseparable 
from the female character, do not in any manner proceed from sexual 
causes, but are entirely the effect of situation and education” (1790a, p. 
202). Gardner interpreted Macaulay’s position as follows: “If women 
remained uneducated, or if they are educated but their position in 
society is allowed to remain unaltered, then it is doubtful that men can 
achieve moral excellence in this inconsistent and unjust environment” 
(1998, p. 128). Titone concurred, noting “Macaulay simply strongly asserts 
that the attainment of perfection is possible for women” (2004, p. 83). 
Who would benefit from her system of education? It was to 
members of the upper classes that she directed her educational 
principles with the understanding that it would lead to a “forbearance of 
his own gratifications, in respect to the feelings of his fellow creatures” 
(1790a, p. 275). Macaulay did not advocate a general, public education 
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for the masses, rather she offered: “That the education of the great, were 
it properly attended to, and pursued on the best rules, would be felt in the 
improved virtue of all the subordinate classes of citizens” (1790a, p. vi). 
Therefore, it was left to the upper classes to be educated, and in turn 
create a moral society in which all the subordinate classes would 
ultimately be improved as well. Her ideal student would become a 
humanitarian intellectual, just like Macaulay herself (Boos and Boos, 1980. 
p. 56).  
Macaulay saw the upper classes as the defenders of justice: 
 
If the higher classes of the people have not wisdom, who will 
be the framers of those laws which enlighten the 
understandings of the citizens in the essentials of right and 
wrong? Where shall we find those examples which are to 
direct the steps of the ignorant in the paths which lead to 
righteousness? Where that public instruction, which teaches 
to the multitudes the relative duties of life? And where those 
decent and well regulated customs, which form the 
difference between civilized and uncivilized nations? (1790a, 
p. 237) 
 
In addition to learning the essentials of right and wrong, the next 
lesson for the upper class was her philosophy of sympathy, or equity:  
 
All human virtue will be found to proceed from equity; 
consequently, if the principle of equity itself owes its source in 
the human mind to the feelings of sympathy, all human virtue 




 Macaulay believed that once the mind was trained in holding 
“benign affections” superior in the mind, through the practice of example, 
precept, customs, and laws, all duties would be performed in the interest 
of humanity. Civilization must improve through the regular course of active 
sympathy. Humans, as moral creatures, would continue to develop and 
improve. She stated, “The human faculties rise, by practice and 
education, from mere capacity to an excellence and an energy which 
enables men to become the carver of his own happiness” (1790a, p. 10). 
Thus Macaulay intended education to be a means whereby man sought 
a morally excellent society in which all people would thrive.  
Macaulay wanted her audience to understand not only the right 
principles of conduct to follow, but “the knowledge also of the 
mechanism of the human mind, which includes the knowledge of its 
discipline”, as it will be “not only an useful but a necessary auxiliary in the 
contest between wisdom and folly, between the dictates of 
understanding and the tumultuous desires of the passions” (1790a, p. 426). 
Thus, education was the means to happiness, happiness was 
perfection, and perfection was the reflection of the divine mind. 
Education was the means to correct social ills, direct the appropriate use 
of power, and overcome human fallibility. More importantly, education 
“tends to instill the principles of equity and benevolence” (Macaulay, 
1790a, p. 236) and it is “the virtue of benevolence … that contains the 
46 
principle of every moral duty” (1790a, p. 112). Sympathetic benevolence 
was the purpose of an educated person; it was the quality that rendered 
obvious the equality of all humans and promoted public happiness. It was 
the antithesis of the tumultuous desires of the passions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
At the end of her book on education Macaulay wrote, “Mankind 
are ever prone to run into the most opposite extremes” (1790a, p. 322). It 
was as if she were summarizing her own thoughts as to the nature of man. 
From man as weak in overcoming his passions to man as perfectible in the 
image of God, she ran the gamut of possibilities in explaining why men 
acted the way in which they did. 
In many ways, Macaulay’s arguments regarding corruption and 
perfection echo the arguments between Lockean liberal and classical 
republican political theories. The Lockean liberal emphasized checks on 
power, limited government, and viewed man as easily susceptible to 
corruption due to weakness and imperfections. On the other side, 
classical republicans believed in the capacity of man to act in a 
disinterested manner for the good of the whole, following the models of 
ancient Greece and Rome. Annie Mitchell described the differences as 
leading to a “polarizing debate” (2004, p. 588) within the study of political 
thought influencing the Founding Fathers. Indeed this polarizing debate is 
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decades old in its evolution with one school in vogue at one time or 
another. A Macaulayian analysis bears witness for both sides of the 
debate as seen from the above study and perhaps supports the need for 
additional research as to why Macaulay’s last book was based on the 
perfectibility of mankind. In changing her opinion from man as corrupt to 
man as perfectible, was she influenced by the success of the Whigs in 
advocating Parliamentary reform as evidence of the changes possible in 
mankind? Or was her belief in millennialism so sincere as to require 
proselytizing prior to her death?  
Any student of Macaulay soon realizes her Lockean liberal roots 
and understands her calls for control within government. If man came to 
perfection through education, how was man to overcome the problem 














A VISION OF GOVERNANCE 
 




Liberal theorists stress the importance of controls over government, 
elimination of corruptive influences, and the necessity of the rule of law. 
Liberalism has been defined as a political theory of limited government 
providing institutional guarantees for personal freedom (Rosenblum, 1989, 
p. 5). It is an ideology opposed to political absolutism and arbitrariness; it 
seeks to restrain corruption through regulations designed to allow less than 
perfect humans to rule; and its first principle is the rule of law (Shklar, 1989, 
p. 37). A theory of liberal government relies on history to demonstrate that 
humans will behave badly, to various forms of excess, unless prevented 
from doing so (Shklar, 1989, p. 28). History becomes the evidence after 
centuries of experience that those in power allow personal interest to 
prevail over the interest of others. Shklar defined it as the liberalism of fear: 
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a fear of arbitrary, unexpected, unnecessary, and unlicensed acts of 
force, which ultimately inflicts pain over the weak by the strong (1989, p. 
29). It is left to the design of government and its institutions to create the 
mechanisms by which power is controlled and fear relieved. 
It was this fear that Macaulay so aptly described throughout her 
writing of history and which so strongly ties her to liberal theory. Macaulay 
vigorously opposed abuse of authority and the arbitrary rule associated 
with the divine right of kings; she advocated checks on power as defined 
through her model of limited government and its separation of powers; 
and above all else, she revered the rule of law. This chapter will review 
Macaulay’s writings in an effort to describe her vision of governance as 
one based on Lockean liberal inclinations to check power. It begins with a 
synopsis of her view on the divine right of kings’ theory and her efforts to 
promote democracy rather than continue under the tyranny of absolute 
power. Macaulay believed in monarchy but not absolutist monarchy, that 
is, sole authority resting in the sovereign. She opposed the prerogative, a 
privilege extended to certain rank, she distrusted hereditary power for its 
reliance on birth order, and she took exception to both the aristocracy 
and “the great landholders, who held their estates from father to son, by 
feudal entail” (1772, p. 361). She sought to curtail aristocratic privilege at 
every turn. The means to do so was through land reform and expansion of 
democratic proposals, such as popular representation through the 
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“abolition of rotten boroughs, the extension of the franchise, the 
expansion of the number of county members, and vote by ballot, a mode 
used in every wise government in all cases of election” (Macaulay, 1783, 
pp. 330, 337, 339). Next, the chapter moves to a discussion of Macaulay’s 
views on the separation of governmental powers between the throne and 
Parliament. By separating and defining the responsibilities of each branch 
of government, Macaulay sought to reduce the power of the crown while 
simultaneously increasing the rights of the people, where she thought true 
sovereignty lay. She believed that a mixed government of king, lords, and 
commons “is the only democratical system, rightly balanced, which can 
secure the virtue, liberty, and happiness of society” (1767, p. 21). The 
chapter ends with a look at Macaulay’s interpretation of the rule of law 
and the equality of subject and sovereign before the law. Taken together, 
Macaulay’s liberal vision of governance supports the ideal suggested by 
liberal theorist William Galston: 
 
Liberal institutions are designed to neutralize insofar as 
possible the strength that would otherwise be employed to 
oppress the vulnerable, and to enhance to the extent 
feasible the ability of the weak to defend themselves. Liberal 
rights, and the institutions in which they move may be 
asserted, afford the most effective bulwark against the worst 







Limitations to monarchical privilege 
As tools of political understanding, Macaulay’s pamphlets offer 
insight into her views of government and sovereignty. Her first essay, 
published in 1767, was composed of two parts: she described the evils of 
absolute monarchy by contesting Thomas Hobbes’ support of the crown 
and she attempted to show the benefits that could be realized through a 
democratic form of government. She did this by creating a mock republic 
for the triumphant eighteenth-century Corsican revolutionary general 
Signor Pasquale Paoli. 
Macaulay step by step challenged three arguments she alleged 
that Hobbes made in preferring monarchy as the best form of 
government. Here Macaulay characterized Hobbes’s argument: 
 
First, that the whole universe is governed by one God: 
secondly, that the ancients preferred the monarchical state 
beyond all others: thirdly, that the paternal government 






That the universe is governed by one god we will not dispute; 
and will also add, that God has an undoubted right to govern 
what he has himself created, and that it is beneficial to the 
creature to be governed by the Father of all things; but that 
this should be an argument for a man to govern what he has 
not created, and with whom a nation can have no such 
paternal connection, is a paradox which Mr. Hobbes has left 
unsolved (1769, pp. 9 –10). 
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 Next, she drew from her study of Greek and Roman history to 
disprove the claim that the ancients preferred monarchy, stating, “The 
Greeks…disdained this government, and called all pretenders to it tyrants 
and usurpers” (1769, p. 10). 
 In her third argument she challenged the assertion that government 
instituted by God was monarchical: “The power Adam had over his 
children is not mentioned as of the monarchical kind. We find him 
nowhere exercising this power or claiming it as his due” (1769, p. 10). 
 Macaulay’s argument with Hobbes continued over a discussion of 
who was fit to govern. Knowing that some men sought power and 
privilege for personal reasons, Macaulay advocated controls to ensure 
the elevation of those who would provide good administration rather than 
those seeking personal aggrandizement: 
  
The peculiar excellence of a government, properly 
constituted, is to raise those to the administration whose 
virtues and abilities render them capable of this arduous task; 
and to deprive those of that office, who upon trial are found 
at all defective: therefore, a well-constituted government 
can never be so long ill administered as to become a 
grievance to the subject (1769, p. 9). 
 
 
  Having compared her argument with Hobbes, Macaulay’s first 
political pamphlet established her reputation as one who opposed 
absolute authority and who believed that man was capable of governing 
himself. According to historian Wendy Gunther-Canada: 
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Thus her [Macaulay] argument with Hobbes in “Loose 
Remarks” encapsulated the central thesis of her historical 
project in the multivolume History of England: the prerogative 
of an absolute monarch is incompatible with the practice of 
good government (Gunther-Canada, 2006, p. 158). 
 
 Hobbes was not the only target of Macaulay’s critique of absolute 
power. In telling the story of history Macaulay sought to “attack the 
formidable pretensions of the Stewart (sic) family, and set up the banners 
of Liberty against a tyranny which had been established for a series of 
more than one hundred and fifty years” (1763, p. viii). She demonstrated 
her accord with the theory of liberalism with her opposition to absolutism. 
She did this by recounting exhaustive tales of the manner and means by 
which each member of the royal family used the throne for personal 
enhancement, be it foreign wars, religious doctrines, or political 
prosecutions. Her theme was simple – absolute power was rarely used for 
the common good; it was fashioned for personal reward alone. She 
wrote: 
 
The common pomp of a court is a heavy burden to society; 
and a man who had but few kindred and favorites, may 
lavish on them few the spoils of a whole nation. This…has 




The purpose of these ad hominem attacks was to enlighten her 
readers of the abuses that arose from nothing more than hereditary right 
and the power associated with it. Showing the monarchy in a consistently 
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negative light was Macaulay’s way to educate her readers on the abuse 
of royal power. For instance, Macaulay attacked James I for insisting that 
“Kings sat in the throne of God and from thence all judgment is 
derived…Encroach not upon the prerogative” (1763, pp. 97 – 98). In 
relating an account of Charles I she reported his request of Parliament to 
surrender its powers over taxation. “Give me your purse”, he had, in 
effect, said, “and you will no longer suffer the injury of violence. Surrender 
willingly your liberty, and what you now complain of as tyranny will 
become law” (1765, p. 31). Macaulay claimed James II had sought to 
strengthen “the power of the reigning prince” by “every diabolical engine 
which the power of a statesman could invent” (1770, p. 12). She was 
critical of William of Orange in his pursuit of “an independent revenue” 
and “a standing army” and thought him either “ignorant on the subject of 
those nice balances which are necessary to the preservation of civil 
liberty” or “as fond of the idol power as his unfortunate predecessor” 
(1778, p. 38). Regarding the last of the Stuart line, in Macaulay’s view, 
Queen Anne was “a bigot to the forms of religion, a slave to her favorites, 
and a victim to her timidity.” Anne was no more than a “football of all 
who had an opportunity of taking advantage of her weaknesses, for the 
promoting [of] their private views” (1772, p. 271). Macaulay’s acrimony 
toward absolute power appeared also in her private conversation. 
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Speaking with American diarist Sylas Neville in her home in 1768, she is 
purported to have said: 
Tyranny is contrary to all our ideas of God; indeed, if men 
worshipped the Devil, the principles of arbitrary power would 
be very agreeable to the end of his government. But some 
cannot bear the light – it is too strong for them (Ditchfield, 
1974, p. 73). 
 
If assessed as a liberal based upon her antipathy toward absolute power 
Macaulay rated very highly indeed. 
 
Limitations to aristocratic privilege 
Macaulay’s pessimism regarding monarchy, the rule of one, 
applied equally to the aristocracy, the rule of a “best” few. In her 1769 
argument with Hobbes she noted, “The question of government is here 
artfully, or perhaps ignorantly, confined to two classes, which are equal 
usurpations on the rights of men, viz. absolute monarchy, and absolute 
aristocracy” (1769, p.11). In order to limit the power of aristocracy, 
Macaulay sought radical land and voting reforms to dilute the negative 
effects of privilege determined by nothing more than birth order. For 
Macaulay,  
 
Governments formed on principles which promise the equal 
distribution of power and liberty, attach to their service every 
generous inclination which exists in the human character: 
Monarchy, stripped of its trappings, and exposed naked to 
the eyes of reason, becomes odious in the comparison; 
partial benefit is exploded, the generous plan of universal 
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happiness is adopted, and common good becomes the 
common care (1771, p. 18). 
 
Macaulay believed that “inheritance of title [was] a caprice of 
human nature” (1769, p. 140); aristocracy was a “rank weed” (1771, p. 
32), and its titles mere “fanciful distinctions” (1771, p. xii). Privilege did 
nothing to promote the common good and was more a reflection of 
vanity and self-interest (Beckwith, 1954, p. 144). Men who assumed a 
peerage from the King were guilty of “the temptation of aristocratic 
privilege” (1768, p. 297) and she related many instances in which former 
heroes to the cause of liberty succumbed to “a title fixed immutably to 
the crown” (1771, p. 5). She believed it impossible for a man to both hold 
a title and have a true interest in the welfare of the people. A sinecure 
was anathema to the virtue necessary for impartial governance. While 
she believed in natural superiorities she did not believe in artificial 
manifestations of rank (Beckwith, 1954, p. 146). Macaulay wrote: 
 
It is necessary that all the means by which a personal 
influence may be established by the grants of lands and 
large pensions, should be taken away: and for the same 
reasons of policy, it is necessary that the executive power 
should not be capable of deluding the imaginations of men, 
by creating artificial distinctions among them (1790b, pp. 39 – 
40). 
 
Political influence and access to power were previously based upon this 
firmly established hierarchy. She knew that “the extension of popular 
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powers have ever been regarded with a jealous eye by misinformed and 
selfish nobility” (1770, p. 11).  
According to Robbins’ account of the period, eighteenth-century 
Whigs, like Macaulay, feared that “too great an accumulation of wealth 
in the hands of a few might disturb the balance of the state” (1959, p. 13). 
Her lifelong pursuit of land reform resulted from her observation of the 
connection between wealth and power. She wrote: 
 
I have always considered the boasted birthright of an 
Englishman, as an arrogant pretension, built on a beggarly 
foundation. It is an arrogant pretension, because it intimates 
a kind of exclusion to the rest of mankind from the same 
privileges; and it is beggarly, because it rests our legitimate 
freedom on the alms of our princes (1790b, p. 15). 
 
 
The problem for Macaulay was the traditional law of inheritance, 
which fostered concentration of land and influence among a few large 
property holders. In order to change the tradition, Macaulay suggested 
“fixing the Agrarian” or eliminating the law of primogeniture with regard to 
inheritance of land and property. She wanted to eliminate the 
presumption to power that came solely by birth. In recommending land 
reform, Macaulay embraced the tenets of Commonwealthman James 
Harrington and based her argument on doctrine found within Harrington’s 
Oceana (1649). Macaulay shared with him two beliefs: history was key to 
understanding politics, and property was the source of political power. 
Both writers held that reform of inheritance laws was a prerequisite to 
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democracy. Further, she supposed that if the Roman republic had 
addressed land reform, it would not have devolved into anarchy with its 
attendant rise of absolute power. She wrote: 
 
Had the agrarian ever been fixed on a proper balance [in 
ancient Rome], it must have prevented that extreme 
disproportion in the circumstances of her citizens, which gave 
such weight of power to the aristocratical party, that it 
enabled them to subvert the fundamental principles of the 
government, and introduce those innovations which ended in 
anarchy. Anarchy produced its natural effect, viz. absolute 
monarchy (1767b, p. 25). 
 
Macaulay saw the connection between power and wealth derived 
from large estates and considered land reform necessary as an interdict 
to corruption. For her, broader land ownership fostered citizenship. Like 
Jefferson, Macaulay viewed small farms as promoting strong morals: 
 
For every citizen who possesses ever so small a share of 
property, is equally as tenacious of it as the most opulent 
member of society; and this leads him to respect and support 
all the laws by which property is protected” (1790b, p. 19).  
 
Therefore, in order to reduce the power and influence that came from 
landed wealth, Macaulay encouraged dramatic changes to the rules of 
inheritance. No longer would the oldest son inherit all the wealth 
according to the exclusive right of primogeniture. The landed and 
personal effects of every man would be equally divided, between the 
male heirs only, at his death. An equal division of property would prevent 
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the concentration of wealth and power in any particular family. Her 
reforms included provisions for the widows, the education of the female 
children, and allowed annuities for unmarried adult females.  
Other reforms Macaulay sought included modifications to dower 
rights, another tradition by which the aristocracy was sustained. Macaulay 
noted that within the growing commercial class, daughters of wealthy 
merchants were being matched with impoverished, but titled, young 
men. Bringing a dowry perpetuated a cycle of privilege based upon 
nothing more than position, rankling her sense of political equality and 
undermining the merits of industry and work. Only a decade after 
Macaulay published these ideas, Jane Austen vividly showed the effects 
of this practice by fictionalizing the accounts of many daughters, land 
poor but dowry rich, who married land rich but struggling young men, with 
characters appearing in the novels Mansfield Park, Persuasion, and Sense 
and Sensibility. As eighteenth-century literary critic Susan Greenfield 
described, Austen wrote of women who lacked “rightful property” but 
who could be made whole for a willing husband (2006, p. 339). Rather 
than a dispersal of wealth among the new merchant class, wealth 
remained within the aristocracy and controlled by a few select families, 
perpetuating the rule of the few.  
Macaulay’s views on the effects of disparities in land ownership 
exhibit the mix of both liberalism and classical republican elements in her 
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thinking. A small landowner next to a large landowner (“a little hovel 
contrasted with a princely palace”) highlighted “an inequality of property 
which is incompatible with a wise and just government” and required 
reform so that “the virtue of citizens will be in a greater security where the 
wholesome restraint of sumptuary laws, banish [passions] from society, 
which are adapted to inflame cupidity, and excite a vicious emulation” 
(1790a, p. 307).  Aristocracy promoted distinctions among men contrary 
to her view of society in which all men were entitled to seek the good life. 
 While she avoided artificial manifestations of rank, Macaulay 
applauded the qualities of industry and work. As a writer she had a 
personal interest in the copyright and she offered her next reform measure 
concerning this issue. She wrote a short pamphlet defending the exclusive 
rights of authors at a time when no common law existed for their 
protection. Observing, “An empty stomach is a bad on spleen and 
melancholy” (1774, p. 16) Macaulay warned that more than pecuniary 
interests were involved in depriving authors of the reward of their literary 
labors. Without proper copyright laws Macaulay saw further inequalities 
between rich and poor. “If literary property becomes common,” she 
wrote, “we can have but two kinds of authors, men in opulence, and men 
in dependence” (1774, p. 37). She feared that the art of writing, a result of 
learning and education, would either be lost or be relegated to those 
serving the rich, who would only wish to preserve their own prejudices and 
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views. Having made a fortune based upon her book sales, Macaulay was 
interested in guaranteeing future generations the opportunity to succeed 
without patron support “and thus to encourage useful literature, by 
rendering it convenient to the circumstances of men of independent 
tempers to employ their literary abilities in the service of their country” 
(1774, p. 46). Writing and the income derived from it was a personal 
freedom for Macaulay. The copyright protected the personal property 
created through the occupation of writing and secured the liberty of its 
owner by removing the fear that others would benefit from something 
they did not create. Enactment of a copyright law protected the weak 
from abuse and protected the ownership of property rights. 
Her ideas of reform, including land, inheritance, and the copyright, 
were intended to reduce the concentration of power in the hands of the 
few while nurturing good citizens through broader land ownership. For 
Macaulay, “true nobility constituted those characteristics which promoted 
the happiness of all men” (1781, p. xii). Providing greater opportunity for all 
men was the best way to check the power of the few, as Publius attests in 
Federalist#84: 
 
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the 
prohibition of titles of nobility.  This may truly be denominated 
the corner stone of republican government for so long as 
they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that 
the government will be any other than that of the people 




 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 changed the line of succession of 
the English throne from the Catholic James Stuart to his Protestant 
daughter Mary and her husband William of Orange. To Macaulay, the 
legal machinations symbolized the provision of a new power to the 
people. She wrote: 
 
A change in the succession, and this on the freest principle of 
freedom, it must be owned, was a great point obtained for the 
people. The crown was no longer regarded as private 
property, nor the right of one family to govern, except by a 
few political bigots, respected as sacred and unalienable. The 
people, instead of being considered beasts of burden, and 
livestock on a farm, transferable from father to son, were now 
looked up to as the only legal source of sovereign authority 
(1778, p. 72). 
 
 
For the people to be the legal source of sovereign authority and to 
take their rightful place within representative government required drastic 
changes within the parliamentary system. These reforms would include 
controls required to balance the power between the king, the people, 
and the law. Macaulay, considered a spokesperson for the radical Whigs 
within Parliament, articulated a number of arguments demanding reform 
and promoting republican government. Robbins summarized her opinions, 
“She supported …rotation in office, and advocated annual parliaments, 
equal electoral districts, and manhood suffrage” (1959, p. 352). Hill called 
her reforms more far reaching than the radicalism of the 1760’s and the 
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Country Opposition, as Macaulay called for an extension of the franchise 
and a redistribution of seats (1992, p. 76). 
Believing that “Parliaments have always been considered as one of 
the indisputable privileges of Englishmen” (1769, p. 245f) Macaulay was 
convinced of the legislature’s role in a republic, but not as currently 
constituted, for “impositions, fraud, and rapacity” were evident 
throughout the body. For the radical Whig faction, representation was 
key, and it came about through rotation in office to reduce corrupting 
influences, more frequent elections, providing a more equitable basis for 
representation, and expansion of the franchise. 
Had the Roman republics instituted term limits, republican 
government would remain extant Macaulay opined: 
 
The rotation of all the places of trust is so strong a preservative 
against the decay of a republic, that the Roman constitution, 
though otherwise defective, might perhaps have stood to this 
day, had the Romans never dispensed with that salutary  
ordinance (1769, p. 24). 
 
 
Corruption was constantly on Macaulay’s mind. Controlling 
corrupting influences was paramount because, “No state can wisely be 
confident of any public minister continuing good longer than the rod is 
over him” (1768, p. 403). Macaulay believed that rotation in office was 
one of the best means of preventing corruption among officeholders 
“That as democratical power never can be preserved from anarchy 
64 
without representation, so representation never can be kept free from 
tyrannical exertions on the rights of the people without rotation” (1770, p. 
19). Rotation applied equally to elected officials as well as administrative 
personnel, with deputies, generals, admirals, and civil magistrates all 
subject to its limitations and checks on power. 
In describing her ideal government she suggested: 
 
Let the whole senate be changed once in three years, by a 
third part at a time yearly. Let the vacant posts be supplied 
from the body of representatives, by the election of the 
people. If any of the representative members should be 
elected into the senate, who are not by the course of the 
rotation to go out of the representative council, their places 
must be supplied by the people. Let no member of either the 
senatorial or representative body, be capable of re-election 
under the space of three years (1769, p. 26). 
 
Responding to Burke, Macaulay was critical of the existing seven-
year maximum term for Parliaments and recommended more frequent 
elections: 
 
If triennial parliaments will not serve the turn, change the half, 
or the whole of your corrupt parliament yearly, and deprive 
your representatives of a corrupt and standing interest in the 
legislature, (The depriving every member of parliament of a 
corrupt and standing interest in the legislature, by rendering 
them incapable of serving any sinister views of the court, must 
effectually destroy the venom of that influence which the 
author of the Cause of the present Discontents seems to think 
irremediable) by debarring every member of parliament of 
the capacity of re-election under a certain term of years 




Burke, to his credit, wrote, “Mrs. Macaulay’s performance was what I 
expected; there are however none of that set who can do better, the 
Amazon is the greatest champion amongst them” (Burke, 1770, p. 150). 
Next to be addressed, according to Macaulay, was the elimination 
of the rotten boroughs, as “The problem with the current English 
government is the lack of even representation” (1790b, p. 23). Crown 
men, whose appointments rendered them nothing but slaves to the King, 
led the rotten boroughs. The Members served at the pleasure of the 
crown and were beholden to the King for position, household officers, and 
pensions. Macaulay expressed her concerns on this matter, noting “For 
that which constitutes the defects in all governments, are those principles 
in them which support a partial interest, to the injury of the public one” 
(1790b, p. 36). According to Macaulay, 
 
The subject of the friends of equal representation is, that the 
important interests of the great body of Commons is, by our 
present inadequate state of representation, sacrificed to the 
ambition of private individuals, who, by their command over 
boroughs, may make their market with government at the 
expence (sic) of the public. The strong and firm opposition 
which the ruling powers have given to every step towards this 
reasonable reformation is not one of the happiest effects 
which arise from the continued war of interests so much 
admired by Mr. Burke and others (1790b, p. 24). 
 
 
Macaulay asserted that only through fair and equal representation 
could democratic influence be exerted. Macaulay’s argument was made 
in her second reply to Burke, published in 1790, challenging his 
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observations on the French Revolution. Fully in support of the French in 
their struggle against the ancien regime, she thought the National 
Assembly heroic for its stance on political equality and its promotion of 
liberty. She admired the energy displayed in the taking of ecclesiastical 
lands in France and the reforms to the juridical system. 
The final argument espoused by Macaulay and the radical Whigs to 
bring a check on power and expand democracy focused an expansion 
of the franchise, or the right to vote. The expansion of the right to vote 
meant lowering eligibility requirements in order to allow more persons the 
opportunity to elect their representatives. Macaulay wrote, “A more 
extended and equal power of election [is] a very important spring in the 
machine of political liberty” (1770, p. 19). In both her History and her last 
pamphlet commenting on the French Revolution, Macaulay specified the 
requirement for voting privileges as “industry”; either the price of three 
days labour or property ownership. A pauper living off societal alms was 
disqualified from voting but a man able to be taxed due to the fruits of his 
labor “had the ability to obtain the highest honours of his country” (1790b, 
p. 37). Macaulay’s proposed voting requirements were much more lenient 
than those in use at this time in eighteenth-century England. She wrote “It 
is on the basis of industry alone, the only principle which exactly squares 
with a native right, and not on rent tolls, that the legislature has formed 
the rights of representation” (1790b, p. 38). By allowing workers, not just 
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landowners, franchise privileges reduced the concentration of power in 
the hands of a few. Expansion of the franchise was, of course, 
controversial and it must be realized that, although Macaulay’s views 
were radical for her time, even she did not support universal suffrage. In 
this regard, her views were similar to those of her fellow 
Commonwealthmen. As Robbins noted of these writers, “Not many Real 
Whigs or Commonwealthmen had troubled about the dregs of society” 
and their egalitarianism, such as it was, “looked not to the leveling tracts, 
but to the great Whig canon for support” (1959, p. 315).   
 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Macaulay’s favorite period of English history, the Commonwealth, 
taught her to question: 
 
Why should one man alone possess all what men desire? And 
that every other individual in a whole nation, however fruitful 
that nation is of worthy men, should be thus deprived of their 
share of the government? (1767b, p. 13) 
 
 
For Macaulay, the sharing of government meant the separation of 
powers. The separation of powers had a different connotation in 
Macaulay’s era than we use today. Separation of powers meant mixed 
government, a balanced blend of monarchy, aristocracy, and 
democracy sharing the powers of government. Macaulay’s concern was 
that a strong king and an ineffective parliament led to a diminution both 
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in liberty and representation for the people. Domination by one institution 
created loss in another. The legislature was meant to be a check on the 
tyranny associated with the executive, as she wrote: 
 
Parliament, viz. a right in the people of assembling by 
representatives, to assist at the making new laws, the 
abolishing old ones, or to give an assent or negative to 
extraordinary levies of money, a precious privilege, which the 
people had yet preserved from the ruins of the Gothic 
constitution, had in it many latent resources to preserve 
Liberty, which had given way, though not entirely yielded, to 
the encroachment of successful tyranny (1763, p. 262). 
 
 
Having previously noted Macaulay’s belief that first, absolute 
privilege was abhorrent to the promotion of the good of society, and 
second, that Parliament was an indisputable privilege of Englishmen, how 
could powers be separated to achieve a balanced government and 
protect the liberty of the people? 
 The answer came in a response to Burke where she reviewed the 
negative consequences of the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It was a time 
Macaulay wrote, when the House of Commons, “who had been taught 
by experience of what followed the restoration of Charles the Second, 
that is was a much easier thing to make kings, than to limit their 
prerogatives after they were made” (1783, p. 314), failed to exercise their 
authority. The end result was that Parliament undermined its own power 
and established an overly strong king. Parliament had rendered: 
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The crown strong enough to set all parties [whig, tory, 
jacobites] at defiance, to put them on their good behavior, 
and to treat them with that contempt which is natural to a 
sovereign in the plentitude of independent power (1770, pp. 
12 – 13). 
 
 
 Why did Parliament abdicate its role - for the allurements of power 
and the sinecures that come from deference to power? Yes, the men in 
Parliament succumbed to the temptations of favoritism and privilege. Had 
Parliament stood its ground, the result would be a body that made the 
crown more accountable not less. Macaulay stated her vision of the role 
of parliaments, a true check on power that came through accountability: 
  
A vigilant and jealous eye over executory and judicial 
magistry, an anxious care of public money, an openness 
approaching toward facility to public complaints; these seem 
to be the true characteristics of a house of commons…. An 
independent parliament, the true parliament of the people, is 
entrusted with sufficient powers to keep the executive parts 
of the government in subordination, which must prevent any 
possible infringement either of the form or the spirit of the 
constitution…a parliament fulfilling its duty will on no pretence 
whatsoever suffer more money to be raised on their 
constituents than is necessary for their defense, and the 
decent magnificence of their governors (1770, pp. 15, 18, 19).  
 
 
However, corruption had taken root within parliament, liberty was 
expiring, and “every salutary principle in the constitution calls instantly and 
loudly for a speedy and effectual reform” (1770, by. 17). Macaulay 
accused its members of failing to act in a manner that would bring about 
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reform, such as rotation in office and direct election of representatives. 
The result, she wrote, was: 
 
The destructive grievance of a debt of one hundred and forty 
million, a grievance which operates powerfully and variously 
against public freedom; a strong military standing force, 
contrary to the very existence of real liberty; an army of 
placemen and pensioners, whose private interest is 
repugnant to the welfare of the public weal: septennial 
parliaments, in violation of the firmest principle in the 
constitution; and heavy taxes imposed for the single 
advantage and emolument of individuals, a grievance never 
submitted to by any people, not essentially enslaved (1770, 
pp. 10 – 11). 
 
 Macaulay’s ideal vision of parliament – vigilant and jealous, having 
anxious care and openness – represented an active entity rather than a 
passive one. By keeping the executive body in subordination she revealed 
both her preference for legislative responsibility and the legislature’s 
obligation to control executive power. In this respect Macaulay’s theory 
was again in accord with liberal theory, as it set forth her plan for a 
defense against oppression and abuse of authority by individual leaders. 
Macaulay tipped her hand toward the legislature in an earlier work 
published in 1769. At the conclusion of her attack on Hobbes’s support of 
the divine right of kings she created an ideal republic in a short sketch on 
government. She outlined a bicameral legislature, reinforced her views on 
term limits, and identified members of the governing body, or Cabinet. In 
her pamphlet Macaulay addressed both the separation of powers 
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between the executive and legislative branches of government, as well 
as within the legislature itself. There were to be two houses, the senate 
and the people. She described it thus: 
 
In a well-constituted senate there is wisdom; and, if this order 
is prevented by proper restraint from invading public liberty, 
they will be the surest guardians of it. The second order is 
necessary, because without the people [who] have authority 
enough to be thus classed, there can be no liberty (1767, p. 
22). 
 
  Additionally, she wrote: 
 
The design of a general assembly must ever be the good of 
the commonwealth, as conducive to their own general and 
particular good: this leads them to pitch on those persons, 
whose virtues and abilities are most capable to serve the 
public (1767, p. 15). 
 
The senate was to number no more than fifty, culled from the lower 
house. The lower house, also referred to as the people, was to include no 
more than two hundred and fifty persons. The country was to be divided 
into districts and the lower house elected directly from these districts. The 
people, or the lower house, would elect the members of the cabinet from 
the senate, including the generals, admirals, civil magistrates, and 
“officers of every important post”. Cabinet members were entitled to vote 
in the senate during their tenure in office. Legislation emanated from the 
general public, in a manner not defined but taken as being derived from 
citizen participation and interest in the affairs of government. Legislation 
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was first to be debated by the senate and then to the representative 
body. She wrote, both the senate and the people “must debate the 
power of determining peace and war, imposing taxes, and the making 
and altering laws” (1767, p. 24). The whole senate had to be changed 
once every three years and vacancies were to be filled by the house of 
the people. Vacancies occurring in the house were filled by a general 
election. No person could serve longer than one three-year term. All 
members of the cabinet were to resign at the end of one year.   
Regarding the executive, she wrote: 
 
If the exigencies of the republic should ever find it necessary 
to lodge the executive powers of government in the hands of 
one person, let there be a law to limit it to one month. The 
representatives have the power of nominating the person, 
and the powers may continue up to one year (1767, p. 27). 
 
 
 Her liberal affection for rotation in office is clearly evidenced in 
these passages. What is more obvious however, is her fear of the 
accretion of power in the hands of any one person, officer, or institution. 
Clearly her sketch is naïve in its understanding of the complexities of 
governmental operations; it is also emblematic of her liberal approach to 
limited power. Inchoate as the model might be for a fledging republican 
government it nonetheless illustrates the trepidation attendant to a strong 
executive branch ruling government. Limiting the executive to a one-
month term is tantamount to granting no power at all.  
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THE RULE OF LAW 
The theory of liberalism requires strict adherence to the rule of law; 
the means whereby arbitrary power is suppressed and freedom is 
promoted. For Macaulay, the rule of law was the means by which 
authority was bridled and liberty was allowed to flourish, for “Law was 
Liberty” (1769, p. 13). In this quote Macaulay echoes John Locke’s 
exhortation from The Second Treatise of Government (1690), “Where there 
is no law there is no freedom”. Both emphasized the importance of law to 
the securing of natural rights granted to man. She wrote, “The law is the 
ground of all authority; all authority and rule are dependent on the law” 
(1765, p. 78). The rule of law required consistency in its application, 
something that the king’s prerogative made very difficult to follow. In 
applying the concept of the rule of law to all, Macaulay knew it must be 
equally applied to ruler and ruled: 
 
Power is regarded by all men as the greatest of temporal 
advantages. The subject can only be bound to obedience 
on the considerations of public good; but the Sovereign, on 
these considerations, and a thousand others equally binding, 
is tied to the exact observance of the laws of that constitution 
under which he holds his power (1775, p. 19). 
 
Macaulay’s traced her concept of the rule of law to the Magna 
Carta tradition that government should not proceed except in 
accordance with the law of the land. Consistent with her thoughts 
regarding education, she equated reason with the law: 
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That the law of the land is the perfection of reason carried 
into practice in all matters of dispute between man and man. 
The perfection of reason is the power of judging agreeable to 




 In Macaulay’s view of the world all people were equal before the 
law. Therefore, eliminating personal influence and abolishing the use of 
the prerogative, in order to allow government to operate on a level basis 
was necessary. Without artificial distinctions, “the same laws which limited 




 Liberal theory respected the rule of law because it eliminated the 
arbitrariness of absolute rule. To support her belief, time and again 
Macaulay inveighed against the Stuarts and illustrated how their reigns 
were infused with the tincture of arbitrary power. In portraying James the 
First’s arbitrary caprice, she described an incident after he was crowned 
King, just “six hours after Elizabeth’s decease” and was marching from 
Edinburgh to London: 
 
His ignorance of the laws of England, and the high idea he 
had conceived of his present power by the arbitrary 
proceedings of his predecessors, made him, upon his arrival 
at Newark, guilty of the absurd violence of hanging a thief 
without form or trial (1763, p. 2). 
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Shortly following his ascent to the throne James was asked to affirm the 
position of religious toleration in a petition sent to him by Puritans. 
Macaulay described the outcome in a footnote: 
 
The Puritans about this time suffered so severe a persecution, 
that they were driven to offer a petition for relief to the King, 
whilst he was taking the diversion of hunting. James was 
something startled at this unexpected intrusion, and very 
graciously directed them to depute ten of their members to 
declare their grievances to the council. These deputies no 
sooner made their appearance before the council than they 
were sent to jail (1763, p. 7). 
 
 
Convinced of his own abilities and seduced by the flattery he met with 
upon accession, James was confident of his supreme power as monarch. 
When Parliament found this idea “not only destructive to the constitution, 
but irreconcilable to every rational principle” (1763, p. 42), James 
prorogued both houses for months at a time. Only when money was 
needed to pay the debts of the crown was Parliament called to order.  
 In discussing the theory of liberalism and the law, Shklar stated, 
“There is no reason at all to abandon it. It is the prime reason to restrain 
governments….Without well defined procedures, honest judges, 
opportunities for counsel and for appeals, no one has a chance” (1989, p. 
37). Macaulay illustrated that point with her description of the usurpation 
of the rule of law that resulted when James gained control over the 
judges and courts. Sentences to the Tower of London, torture, and loss of 
property were the standard result of anyone disagreeing with the King or 
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his minions. Without controls or limitations, no one could be certain how 
laws were to be interpreted. Fear was bred into the hearts of law-abiding 
men when the rule of law was trammeled for the benefit of the few. 
In the ultimate example of how no man is above the law, Macaulay 
defended the killing of King Charles. Defeated in battle and brought 
before Parliament for his impeachment, Macaulay described how: 
 
The numberless instances in which Charles had violated the 
laws of the land, roused the attention of the nation to 
develop the real genius of the constitution; and the accuracy 
with which the Commons at this period examined the legal 
rights of the monarchy, which crowded into one point of view 
all the oppressive usurpations of the crown (1765, p. 3). 
 
 
One critic wrote of Macaulay’s passages: 
 
  
Given her point of view on the Civil War, Macaulay’s 
description of Charles’ character was remarkably 
judicious…he showed genuine dignity and courage in the 
face of his condemnation. But on the other hand, men should 
not be blinded by Charles’ brave end to the point of 
forgetting his actions which led to that fate…on balance she 
found Charles’s passion for power to be his worst vice, and 
concurred completely in the verdict against him (Withey, 
1976, p. 75).  
 
 
 In the closing pages of her History Macaulay quoted directly from 




When a sovereign, by enlarging the limits of that power with 
which he is vested for the protection of the people, weakens 
the authority of the laws, and consequently the security of the 
subject; when he acts in opposition to the just ends for which 
government was instituted, and from a protector of the 
commonwealth becomes an enemy; when, by the breach of 
trust and nonperformance of obligations, the good purposes 
of his institution are inverted; his trust and right to government 
from that period are forfeited, the tie of allegiance is 
dissolved, and the law and the constitution being rendered 
incapable of affording the subject protection, he is no longer 
bound by the forms or dictates, and may justly, by the right of 
self-preservation, take every probable means to secure 
himself from the lawless power and enterprises of the tyrant 




Macaulay’s brand of liberalism jumps from the pages of her history. 
Built from the premise requiring abolition of absolutism, checks on power, 
and equality before the law, Macaulay clearly fit the liberal mode. 
Whether advocating for the elimination of royal prerogative or seeking 
reforms to limit the rank weed of the aristocracy, Macaulay envisioned a 
society based less on corruption and influence and more upon merit. 
Opportunity was created through reforms within Parliament, such as 
expansion of the franchise, term limits, and more frequent elections. In 
addition to reform, the separation of the powers of government was also 
necessary to prevent any one group from using its advantage over 
another. Not only were powers to be separated between branches of 
government, but within the branches as well. As a final point to illustrate 
her liberal convictions, she believed the rule of law was paramount for the 
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operation of government. Violation of the law had consequences as 
demonstrated by the death of Charles I. 
There has been little to no assessment of Macaulay’s liberalism in 
the analysis of her contribution to the history of ideas. Historians tend to 
categorize her as a radical republican yet it is hard to reconcile this with 
the cynical view of human nature she brings to her model of government. 
If government can only be trusted to men for short periods of time, are 
term limits merited? How are men to be brought into government service? 
What qualifications are necessary to serve? It is an examination of her 

















A VISION OF GOVERNANCE 
 




 Classical republicans stressed civic virtue and political participation 
as emphatically as liberals stressed controls on power and the rule of law. 
Both groups of eighteenth-century theorists favored the mixed 
government of king, lord, and commons and feared the consequences of 
a corrupt political regime that upset this balance. Yet liberals and 
republicans differed in their view of human nature and in what estate 
should rule. According to Gordon Wood’s widely cited account of the 
American Revolution, republicanism was characterized by a love of 
antiquity, especially Greek and Roman history; belief in civic virtue, or a 
disinterestedness in pecuniary reward for service to government; and for 
having a traditional patrician view regarding service within government, 
that is men of liberal education in a governing role (1991, pp. 100 – 108). 
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Having established Macaulay’s credentials as a Lockean liberal, how 
does she compare with Wood’s description of a classical republican?  
 
LOVE OF ANTIQUITY 
 
 Beginning with her first volume of history which she opened with, 
“From my early youth I have read with delight those histories which exhibit 
Liberty in its most exalted state, the annals of the Roman and Greek 
republics” (1763, p. i) to her final book where she avowed, “No assembly 
of men ever displayed such graceful virtues as the Roman senate” and 
“[The Greeks] acquired a degree of perfection which has distinguished 
the Athenians before all the civilized world” (1790a, p. 239 and p. 242), 
Macaulay clearly displayed her enthusiasm for the Greek and Roman 
republics.  So classically republican in her sentiment toward these two 
ways of thinking, she devoted the first six letters in part two of Letters on 
Education to a recital of the high points and low of each civilization. 
 Wood claimed Athens, Sparta, and Thebes were familiar to 
educated people in the eighteenth century (1991, p. 100) and Macaulay 
facilitated that familiarity with accounts of the merits of Socrates, 
Lycurgus, and Cincinnatus. She praised the Spartans for their simplicity 
and disdain for money; she approved of the nobility of Athenian leaders 
for their wisdom to govern, their military skill and courage, and the ability 
of an Athenian to “acquit himself in public debate;” and she admonished  
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“the Christian world would suffer much in a comparison with the Romans 
of the first four centuries after the building of the imperial city” (1790a, p. 
265). The generosity of the Romans in extending the rights of Roman 
citizenship to conquered nations was especially pleasing to Macaulay 
who saw this as evidence of great sagacity on the part of the leaders. 
Unfortunately, due to the frailties of man, the luster of this simpler time was 
lost to the spoils of war: 
 
The spoils of conquered nations flowed in with a full tide on 
the commonwealth, and offered to individuals the most 
inviting opportunities for rapacity and plunder. The simplicity 
and frugality of primitive times were turned to every mode of 
luxury which invention could furnish, either to delight the 
sense, to soothe the caprice of taste, or to gratify the pride of 
wealth (1790a, p. 260). 
 
It was now that an elegantly chafed silver vase could excite 
a Roman pro-consul to the most flagitious acts of tyranny and 
violence. Simplicity and virtue of ancient Rome were lost to 
some of the most profligate kind and turned her mighty 
empire of freedom into an absolute despotism (1790a, pp. 
255 – 256). 
 
 
 In earlier chapters Macaulay’s use of Roman examples was meant 
to exemplify the best that governments could offer as well as the lessons 
to be learnt from past times. Macaulay preached these lessons from the 
decline of the Roman Empire – the avarice of men and the corrupting 
influence of power – and compared it to eighteenth-century England. The 
republican appellation she used was to remember the virtues of integrity 
and selflessness associated with the greatness of Athens and Rome, 
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“When we admire the virtue of the ancients, we admire only that inflexible 
conduct which carried them to sacrifice every personal interest to 
principle” (1790a. p. 272). Of the number of opportunities lost to past 
history, she wrote, the failure to learn the lessons of the past was the 
hallmark of man, “But though the education of the world will give a turn to 
the passions, yet it cannot teach the way to moderate and subdue them” 




 Macaulay believed that humans lived in society for the 
common good, as she wrote: 
 
When the happiness of an individual is properly considered, 
his interest will be found so intimately connected with the 
interests of the society of which he is a member, that he 
cannot act in conformity to the one, without having a proper 
consideration for the other (1790a, p. 271). 
  
True to her republican roots, Macaulay believed that good 
government required good people; those human beings of virtue who 
were disinterested, that is obliged to serve on behalf of others, not on 
behalf of themselves. She wrote, “These are the virtues which ennoble 
human nature: self-denial, general benevolence, and the exalted passion 
of sacrificing private views to public happiness” (1768, p. 22). The 
educational curriculum she espoused would provide the necessary 
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training to bring forth these virtues. Education was the foundation to 
creating a society based on civic virtue, and teachers had to be symbolic 
of those virtues, in order to appropriately educate their students. She 
described the ideal tutor: 
 
His learning must be accompanied with modesty, his wisdom 
with gaiety, his sagacity must have a keenness which can 
penetrate through the veil of prejudice, and attain to the 
high superiority of original thinking; and the virtues of his mind 
must be accompanied by the tenderness of feelings which 
produces the most valuable of all excellencies, and 
unconfined benevolence (1790a, p. 105). 
 
Parents were to hire tutors to teach the children, both male and 
female. “Of all the arts of life, that of giving useful instruction to the human 
mind is the most important” she wrote in Letters (1790a, p. I). 
The most important lesson for the tutor and parents to bestow was in the 
area of sympathy, or benevolence. Benevolence was the basis of civic 
virtue, the root of disinterestedness. She obliquely defined it: 
 
Though we should not confine benevolence merely to the 
not doing injury, yet it is certain that benevolence and injury 
are opposites, which can never unite; and if strict equity does 
in some points of view bear a distinction from benevolence, 
yet the distinction can only be seen in the inferior and 
superior degrees of the same virtue.  
  
None can be acquainted with the happiness annexed to a truly 
benevolent mind, who is not in the possession of it. We are all 
partially good, and some are more extensively so than others; but 
there are few, very few of sons of men, who are benevolent (1790a, 
pp. 113 – 114). 
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How does one acquire a benevolent spirit? She answered: 
 
  
It is example only which can fire the mind to an emulation of 
disinterested actions, which can call its attention to distresses 
without itself; and by retrospect of its own capabilities of 
misery, can teach it with the celerity of thought to transport 
itself into the situation of the suffering object (1790a. p. 115). 
 
 
First, Macaulay advised parents to allow young children to keep as many 
animals as they could possibly tend as one way of practicing 
benevolence. Second, she devised a curriculum for children ages twelve 
to twenty-one, designed to educate them toward both benevolence and 
curiosity, for, as she described: 
 
Pupils trained after the manner I have proposed in these 
letters, will be docile to every advice which points out to them 
the way of gaining any addition to the fund of knowledge 
already acquired: for the love of knowledge is a growing and 
an insatiable appetite. Beside, man, when properly 
educated, is the gentlest of all animals, affectionate to all 
who surround him, and particularly so to those from whom he 
has received important benefits (1790a, p. 139). 
 
 
Unfortunately, Macaulay’s system of education was not the norm, and 
thus, civic virtue was in short supply. She wrote: 
  
The modes of domestic education, Hortensia, as practiced by 
the moderns, are not calculated to instill that wisdom into 
youth which is necessary to guard against the dangers that 
surround it. In a total ignorance of the nature of those things 
which constitute the happiness and the misery of the species, 
young persons are commonly initiated into the circles of 
conversation and the dissipated amusements of the age, at 
that period of life when the affections of childhood are by 
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repeated impressions strengthened into passions, and when 
the passions of adults spring up in the mind (1790a, p. 235). 
 
Macaulay’s belief in the power of civic virtue was also expressed in 
a letter to a friend. Reverend John Ryland wrote to her, complaining of 
the lack of leaders in Parliament. He inquired as to who should serve in 
government. She replied: 
 
He must be capable of understanding this great Truth that 
every individual is interested in the prosperity of his fellow 
Citizen and that in a general sense the welfare of the 
Community at large and the interest of the individual who 
compose it is intimately connected… He must be a man who 
has added to his wisdom Virtue to his virtue Knowledge to his 
knowledge Temperance to his temperance Charity to his 
Charity a superlative love of God and his Country (C. 




Happily for the Americans, there was such a person on this side of 
the Atlantic who embodied Macaulay’s ideal. Shortly after his election to 
the American presidency George Washington responded to a letter he 
had received from her: 
 
The establishment of our new Government seemed to be the 
last great experiment for promoting human happiness by 
reasonable compact in civil Society. It was to be, in the first 
instance, in a considerable degree a government of 
accommodation as well as a government of Laws. Much was 
to be done by prudence, much by conciliation, much by 
firmness. Few who are not philosophical spectators can 
realize the difficult and delicate part which a man in my 
situation had to act. All see, and most admire, the glare 
which hovers round the external trappings of elevated office. 
To me there is nothing in it, beyond the luster which may be 
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reflected from its connection with a power of promoting 
human felicity. Under such a view of the duties inherent to my 
arduous office, I could not but feel a diffidence in myself on 
the one hand; and an anxiety for the Community that every 
new arrangement should be made in the best possible 
manner on the other (G. Washington, personal 
communication, January 1790). 
 
 Washington’s conduct in office established a precedent that 
gained Macaulay’s approbation regarding the role of a civic leader, a 
person who placed the good of the commonwealth above his or her 
own. Once Washington was elected president, her fears regarding the 
control of power were allayed; Washington would “check the progress” of 
enemies to liberty and would be “a bright example” (C. Macaulay, 
personal communication, June 1790) to future presidents. 
 How was civic virtue to be inculcated? Where were the classes of 
men who would provide leadership and governance, as in the model 
established by Washington? As Wood noted, and as Macaulay described, 
it came from a traditional source, a group of liberally educated men of 
wealth and higher class. 
 
MEN OF EDUCATION 
 
According to one historian, “Macaulay, and her friends, saw 
themselves as the enlightened vanguard leading the rest of England 
along the path of virtue and reason” (Withey, 1976, p. 67). Was her 
vanguard an elite group of men without distinction from the aristocracy or 
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was there a more noble cause in effect? Was education the means to 
enlighten the masses for their own protection of liberty or was education 
limited to the intelligent, enlightened few? 
 Macaulay was a republican reformer and an ardent advocate for 
change; her goal was to enable the masses to protect themselves from 
encroachment of unlimited power. A more enlightened public would help 
to purge corrupt institutions. Ironically, the first step was educating new 
leadership - a prince - both in the transformation of knowledge and 
improvement in the social status quo. She wrote: 
 
In all monarchies, Hortensia, the national prosperity, and the 
domestic felicity of a people, so entirely depend on the 
wisdom and goodness of the reigning prince….For the 
histories of all nations demonstrate, that one feeble and 
wicked reign is often sufficient to mar the wisdom of the ages 
(1790a, p. 223). 
   
The reputations of the monarchy, she wrote, “depend on the personal 
virtues of the prince” (1790a, p. 223) and better it was that men of “first 
worth and knowledge” be hired to teach the prince rather than men “of 
the most elevated rank” so as to prevent the prince’s mind from being 
“corrupted by the designing sycophants who crowd about him before his 
reason is sufficiently strong to perceive the difference between vice and 
virtue” (1790a, p. 224). The ideal tutor, for a prince, was 
  
A man of the first virtue, and of the most extensive learning; a 
man, who to the justest (sic) ideas of the rights of his species, 
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unites a thorough knowledge of the domestic and foreign 
interests of the kingdom, its internal situation in regard to the 
state of the poor, the distribution of property, and other 
matters of intelligence, necessary to a just equality in the 
levying taxes, and in the encouragements to be given to 
national industry (1790a, p. 225). 
 
 
 Once found, this person, commoner or noble, was to be trusted 
with hiring the personal staff, choosing visitors, and guarding the prince 
against “the vice, servility, and pageantry of the court, till his 
understanding is sufficiently informed to despise its snares” (1790a, p. 225). 
In addition to history, philosophy, political science, mathematics, and 
science, Macaulay insisted that the tutor expose the prince to life:  
 
Let my philosophic prince…be often carried into those scenes 
of want and misery adapted to move even the obdurate 
heart to pity. Let him mingle his tears with those of the 
wretched, and let him enjoy the luxury of sympathy (1790a, p. 
227). 
 
To know the interests of humanity is the true study of a 
prince…to know himself, and the nature of man, the 
operations of habit, the specific qualities of character, the 
influence of opinion, the powers and weaknesses of our 
frame…with a generous encouragement to those who have 
the spirit to call aloud for the redress of grievances committed 
in the prince’s name (1790a, p. 228). 
 
By inculcating moderation, sympathy, and incitements to virtue, 
Macaulay intended to create a ruler who would perceive that “The 
exalted privilege, that every act of virtue, every performance of duty, 
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every instance of propriety in conduct, affect the public weal” (1790a, p. 
232). She wrote: 
He would perceive the necessity of making the laws the sole 
rule of conduct; he would perceive, that no sovereign can 
reign in freedom, who is under the necessity of intriguing with 
parties; and that a prince, who closely united himself to his 
people by mutual interest and mutual support, will have 




As noted earlier, not just the prince needed to be educated in the 
principles of civic virtue, the people themselves required education. 
Macaulay asked: 
 
If the higher classes of the people have not wisdom, who will 
be the framers of those laws which enlighten the 
understandings of the citizens in the essentials of right and 
wrong? Where shall we find those examples which are to 
direct the steps of the ignorant in the paths which lead to 
righteousness? Where that public instruction, which teaches 
to the multitudes the relative duties of life? And where those 
decent and well regulated customs, which form the 
difference between civilized and uncivilized nations? (1790a, 
p. 237) 
 
After reviewing the differences between educational systems in 
civilized and uncivilized nations, she concluded: 
 
When the manners of society refine, when standards of taste 
are established, when arts are practiced, when sciences are 
studied, and when laws are numerous; it is then that the 
education of citizens, and more especially, of the better sort, 
becomes a matter of the highest importance and difficulty 
(1790a. pp. 238 – 239). 
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What would educating the higher classes bring?  
 
Public education, if well adapted to the improvement of 
man, must comprehend good laws, good examples, good 
customs, a proper use of the arts, and wise instructions 
conveyed to the mind, by the means of language, in the way 
of speech and writing (1790a. p. 274). 
 
Would an educated elite solve the problems of the lower classes? 
 
Shall the fine gentleman and lady leave the pleasures that 
belong to opulence, and amuse themselves in the drudgery 
of business for the advantages of wretches fed by public 
charity? Shall all the pleasures be laid aside for a system of 
accounts and economy, never used in the management of 
their own concerns – and this without any probability of 
gaining by it a title, or reaping the distinctions or emoluments 
of office? Forbid it fashion – forbid it common sense! (1790a, 
pp. 289 – 290) 
 
In actuality, after lengthy discussions of the arts and sciences to be 
studied, the vices to be rejected (amusements, hunting, the reading of 
novels), and the virtues to be adopted (gardening, architecture, 
philosophy) Macaulay believed that the upper classes would assist the 
lower classes. Through knowledge of the tenets of sympathy and 
benevolence, one would come to know the personal satisfactions that 
derive from service. Luxury and dissipation would be replaced by 
accomplishment and love of moderation. Virtues, like vices, would 
become habits over time. 
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Her advocacy for social and educational reforms were but part of 
her overall desire for political reform, that is a more democratic 
government and equal justice for all people, which taken together, would 
improve the general well being of society (Beckwith, 1953, p. 166, Withey, 
1976, p. 72). In America, the concept of benevolence appeared as 
citizen participation in society and public life, not just participation in 
government. Wood acknowledged that the belief in benevolence led to 
an image of a new and better world emerging. According to Wood, “We 
still yearn for a world in which everyone will love one another” (1991, p. 
218). Macaulay’s goal of societal reform through education had lasting 
possibilities. She wrote: 
 
Oh magistrates! Oh legislators! Consider, that in attempting to 
teach others, you may gain truth of the utmost importance to 
yourselves. Consider the solid satisfaction a benign temper 
must feel, in becoming the instrument of the present and 






Most intellectual historians and writers of the “Long” century place 
Macaulay firmly in the classical republican camp. Pocock acknowledged 
that she was one who considered civic virtue to be the end of political life 
(1998, p. 248). He added, “She begins to look like an eighteenth century 
Hannah Arendt, a woman wholly committed to the ancient ideal of 
active citizenship and wholly undeterred by its hyper-intense masculinity” 
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(1998, p. 251). Macaulay historian Kate Davies said, “By 1774 Catharine 
Macaulay was regarded as the figurehead and public voice of British and 
American republicanism…she represented the ideal of public virtue which 
Britain, in the years preceding the war with America, seemed so obviously 
to lack” (2005, pp. 30, 43). Hicks wrote that Macaulay held William III 
responsible “for erecting a bloated Whig monarchy that made active 
citizenship impossible to practice” (2002, p. 171) and ignored the lessons 
of the Commonwealth “when love of country and love of liberty reached 
their zenith” (2002, p. 172). Donnelly characterized her as “a godsend 
against Hume in the conflict of the early years of George III that divided 
the English world quite simply between those who loved liberty and those 
who did not” (1949, pp. 174 – 175) while her biographer, Hill, produced 
documentation in which Horace Walpole recalled Macaulay as chief 
among the republicans of the day (1992, p. 164). Withey emphasized 
Macaulay’s view of perfection when she wrote, “ultimately the dominant 
theme which emerges from all her ideas about human nature, reason, 
and religion, was the possibility of perfection, both in individual 
understanding and morality, and in society as a whole” (1976, p. 61). 
According to historian Davis, Macaulay believed “A righteous God had 
planned a world of ultimate human perfectibility through the use of 
reason” (1988, pp. 9 – 10). These historians allude to a republican 
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Macaulay steeped in virtue and an overriding confidence in the 
perfectibility of mankind. 
Macaulay’s faith in republican government, composed of an 
educated elite serving through a sense of benevolence for the common 
good of all citizens, was an eighteenth-century ideal she passionately 
possessed. Her republican side saw a vision of governance based upon 
emotion not fact. She wrote: 
 
Government can never stand on better, never on firmer, 
never on equitable grounds, than on its good behavior. Just 
government will be felt, its advantages will be seen, its 
security will be fixed in the hearts of its subject, not to be 
shaken by the fantastic or selfish ends of individuals 
(1768, p. 408).  
 
 On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, her liberal 
side saw a vision of governance in which power was derived from the 
people, power had to be checked and controlled, and without laws to 
control it, power had a totally corrupting influence. What lessons do these 














A MACAULAY MODEL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
 
 
 This dissertation began with the premise that the U.S. Constitution 
legitimizes the practice of public administration because public 
administration protects the individual rights of citizens through its 
subordination to the stated powers within the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of government. From the Macaulay perspective, the 
protection of rights and liberty is the rationale behind government for, 
“the just ends of government [are] the full and impartial security of the 
rights of nature” (1770, p. 8). Based upon the legitimacy discussion, the 
purpose of this dissertation was to examine the writings and theories of 
Catharine Macaulay in an attempt to create both a vision of governance 
and a model of public administration for comparison to the discourses 
taking place in American Public Administration today. Given the rationale 
for government, how would the Macaulay model protect citizens, define 
its separate powers, and answer the question, who should rule? While 
Macaulay would concur that the protection of a citizen’s individual rights 
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is a key function of the administrative state, an elucidation of her ideal 
constitutional state is somewhat difficult and made more so by the issue of 
anachronism. Compounding the problem, the tension between 
Macaulay’s liberal and classical republican views of governance might 
suggest dissonance and inconsistency for the modern public administrator 
attempting to operationalize her beliefs. How does one reconcile 
conflicting views of human nature while permitting administrative 
discretion and/or defining the role of the executive? Despite the dissimilar 
bodies of thought to which Macaulay ascribed in her visions of 
governance, there are several concepts that a public administrator might 
adopt in the formation of a model administrative state. First, and most 
importantly, the source of all authority must emanate from the people, 
not God, nor the king, nor the top executive; second, through the rule of 
law, public administration must be active in the practice of checking 
power; third, there is an important role for education within public 
administration; and fourth, the concept of benevolence must be 
reconsidered within twenty-first century public service. Drawing from 
discussions in earlier chapters, one can extrapolate from her writings a 
model of an administrative state that details the formation of public 
administration, focusing on the checking of power, the role of the 
executive, the use of discretionary authority by administrators within the 
framework of the law, the function of the civil service, citizen participation, 
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and the practice of sympathetic benevolence. This chapter will re-
examine Macaulay’s body of work in an effort to align eighteenth-century 
thought with contemporary public administration. Should there be lessons 
to be learned from Macaulay, will they meet the standard she set in 1790? 
 
We cannot with any grounds of reason or propriety, set up our 
own constitution, as the model which all other nations ought 
implicitly to follow, unless we are certain that it bestows the 
greatest possible happiness on the people which in the 




AUTHORITY RESTS WITH THE PEOPLE 
  With the change in the line of succession following the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 determined by Parliament and not heredity, Macaulay 
stated, “the power of the Crown was acknowledged to flow from no 
other fountain than that of contract with the people” (1778, p. 4). 
Revolution was again on her mind in her last pamphlet commenting on 
the events of France in 1789. Publicly challenging Edmund Burke for the 
second time, she wrote in support of the activities in France and 
unequivocally defended the will of the people. She wrote: 
 
That the people have often abused their power, it must be 
granted; for they have often sacrificed themselves and their 
posterity to the wanton will of an individual, and this is the 
foundation of all the regal tyrannies which have subsisted in 
society; but no abuse of their power can take away their 
right, because their rights exist in the very constitution of 
things. If the French people therefore should be so capricious 
as to fling off their new constitution, and subject themselves 
97 
to more unequal forms of government, or even to tyranny, it 
will be agreeable to the course of past experience; but such 
an exertion of power cannot injure their right; and whatever 
form or complexion any future government in France will 
bear, it can have no legitimate source, but in the will of the 
people (1790b, p. 45). 
 
 
 In that final pamphlet before her death Macaulay emphasized the 
point she had been arguing for nearly three decades - the legitimate 
source of power comes from the people. Her argument supports two 
important concepts for the public administrator: one, it legitimizes the U.S. 
Constitution with its emphasis as being derived from “We the people”; 
and two, it legitimizes the separation of powers in the sense that 
precautions are made to prevent abuses of power by the people, whom 
we know from Macaulay’s views on human nature, as being both 
perfectible and corruptible. As Publius asked, “What is government itself, 
but the greatest reflection of human nature? It may be a reflection on 
human nature, that such devices [separation of powers] should be 
necessary to control the abuses of government” (Madison, 1787, p. 288). 
The simple concept of authority resting with the people yet requiring 
controls to administer that authority sets up the argument for the 
formation of the administrative state. Macaulay’s admonition was: 
 
The people, instead of being considered beasts of 
burden…were now looked up to as the only legal source of 
sovereign authority; and it was confessed, that the same laws 
which limited the privileges of the subject, limited the 




Raadschelders and Stillman corroborate Macaulay’s stance 
although in slightly different language, “After all, elected officeholders are 
accountable to the public and career civil servants are accountable to 
their political superior” (2007, p. 5). Once warned that powers must be 
limited, Macaulay saw the nobler vision of government, as stated here: 
 
Government can never stand on better, never on firmer, 
never on equitable grounds, than on its good behavior. Just 
government will be felt, its advantages will be seen, its 
security will be fixed in the hearts of its subject, not to be 
shaken by the fantastic or selfish ends of individuals 
(1768, p. 408).  
 
 
 When viewed from the perspective of human nature, the 
separation of powers becomes more than the checks and balances 
between the various branches of government. It is the method by which 
man’s corruptible nature is prevented from assuming absolute control and   
concentrating the sources of power into the hands of a tyrannical few. 
The separation of powers is the planned limitation of executive authority; it 
is the empowering of the legislature with rule-making authority and 
accountability for government actions; it is a safeguard against interest 
groups or factions assuming tyrannical control; and it is rooted in the 




The Role of the Executive  
 
 In describing a model of the administrative state, it is to the 
executive that the public administrator would turn first. In fashioning a 
model, Macaulay reminded us “that it was a much easier thing to make 
kings, than to limit their prerogative after they were made” (1783, p. 314), 
thus her constitutional model would place severe limitations on the 
executive. Passages extracted from her earlier quoted works revealed an 
executive who was to be nominated from the legislative house 
representing the people, the executive would be limited to one month 
service with the possibility of a full year of service, and limited in power as, 
“the affairs of commerce, and all matters relative to the state and 
executive powers of government, be determined by the representative 
body” (1767, pp. 23 – 24). Quite clearly, Macaulay saw her executive as 
being subordinate to the legislature with the majority of controls coming 
from the representative assembly. She also established a Cabinet 
(“generals, admirals, civil magistrates, and officers of every important 
post”) to be chosen from the senate, with full voting privileges while 
holding the Cabinet position. Macaulay does not delineate between the 
powers of the Cabinet and the powers of the executive, only to note that 
the executive is appointed “if the exigencies of the republic should ever 
find it necessary to lodge the executive powers of government in the 
hands of one person” (1767, p. 27).  
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 Shortly after the pamphlet was published, Macaulay received a 
review from a Pennsylvania reader, possibly Benjamin Rush, who 
questioned allowing members of the military to serve in her model 
government. She responded: 
 
I see you have very strongly one essential quality to the 
composition of a great legislator, viz. distrust: which 
according to the expression of a philosopher is one of the 
nerves of the soul. The contrary to this virtue, viz. confidence, 
has rendered all civil establishments abortive of their just ends; 
and I do assure you, that I should not have suffered generals, 
admirals, and such dangerous officers, to have a vote in the 
senate of my republic, if I had not thought I had sufficiently 
guarded against the selfish evils of such an assembly, or 
individuals of such an assembly, by only allowing them the 
privilege of giving their advice. The senate, you see, has no 
coercive power to put any of their resolutions into practice: 
rotation sufficiently secures the popular assembly from 
corruption; and, without corruption, they never would be 
guided by the selfish views of their superiors (1767, pp. 33). 
 
 
Joyce Appleby noted that republics, by their very nature, had no 
strong executive position in which to emulate (1992, p. 293). Thus, 
Macaulay is left to protect her republic by balancing the ideal of a 
classically republican man of virtue, offering advice from a position of 
disinterest, with the Lockean liberal restraint on power coming from a 
rotation in office. Macaulay tempered her optimism with moderation in 
the formation of the executive, preceding Heinlein’s admonition by two 
hundred years that “goodness alone is never enough. A cold hard 
wisdom is required too, for goodness to accomplish good” (1961, p. 59). 
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 Woodrow Wilson, who was more trusting of persons in official 
positions and more willing, than Macaulay, to grant large powers to 
officials, offered an opposing view: 
 
Suspicion in itself is never healthful either in the private or in 
the public mind. Trust is strength in all relations of life; and, as it 
is the office of the constitutional reformer to create conditions 
of trustfulness, so it is the office of the administrative organizer 
to fit administration with conditions of clear-cut responsibility 
which shall insure trustworthiness. 
 
And let me say that large powers and unhampered discretion 
seem to me the indispensable conditions of 
responsibility….if…he feels himself intrusted with large 
freedom of discretion, the greater his power, the less likely is 
he to abuse it, the more is he nerved and sobered and 
elevated by it (1997, p. 22). 
 
 Wilson’s strong executive would have been anathema to 
Macaulay’s vision of the executive. There were to be no unfettered 
powers, no prerogative associated with office, and no chance that the 
responsibilities of office would act as a self-control mechanism in her 
model of government. While both Wilson and Macaulay aspire to having 
a man of education and culture acting on behalf of the best interests of 
society with sense and vigor, once in office, Macaulay would give that 
executive limited scope and authority and ensure a short term in office in 
order to warrant the possibility of less tyranny and corruption. 
 Similarly, Macaulay would not support Luther Gulick’s focus on 
executive functions and the role of upper-level management. 
102 
Considering these too similar to the king’s Privy Council and sycophant 
advisors, Macaulay would distrust such a narrow focus of power in the 
hands of an appointed few and would rather share powers among an 
elected Cabinet with advice coming from the representative assembly. In 
fact, from her brief sketch of a model government, the legislative branch 
would be more involved in planning, organizing, directing, and 
coordinating than the executive branch would be, similar in view to the 
legislative-administrative plan espoused by William Willoughby (Shafritz & 
Hyde, 1997, p. 64). She offered this example: “The true parliament of the 
people, is entrusted with sufficient powers to keep the executive parts of 
the government in a subordination, which must prevent any possible 
infringement either of the form or the spirit of the constitution” (1770, p. 
17). 
 Likewise, Macaulay would not consider advice from classical public 
administration theorists in establishing a hierarchical work structure in 
which the executive would issue orders, manage projects, or supervise 
employees toward the efficient accomplishment of objectives and goals. 
Her executive would be checked at every step along the way. 
 What happens when the executive oversteps constitutional 
authority? Was regicide the only recourse left to an abuse of executive 
power? Fortunately, eighteenth-century society had more progressive 
ideas of punishment than the axe and halter. The legislature would be 
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empowered with the tool of impeachment, “that great guardian of the 
purity of the constitution” (1770, p. 15). When required, impeachment by 
the legislative branch was permitted for persons guilty of “endeavoring 
the subversion of the constitution; in changing, by a tyrannical 
administration, the government into an absolute monarchy; and 
subjecting the liberties and properties of the subject to arbitrary will and 
pleasure" (1769, pp. 174 – 175). Macaulay would put her executive on 
notice that exceeding the limits of the constitution would not be 
tolerated. 
  
The Role of the Legislature 
 
 In an earlier chapter, the Macaulay ideal of a legislative assembly 
was defined; it was composed of two houses, the senate – offering 
wisdom, and the representatives – drawn from the people, who protect 
liberty. Through the legislature the executive was chosen, and from the 
senate the Cabinet was chosen. The people’s assembly filled the vacant 
seats and initiated legislation; similar in fashion to Baron Charles Louis 
Montesquieu’s “reworking of the republican thesis that the best way of 
ensuring the legislation reflected the common interest was to have it 
made by the people” (Bellamy, 2001, p. 445). Montesquieu, like 
Macaulay, thought the elected representative should be geographically 
based in order to prevent the types of corruption that arose from 
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representation based upon rotten boroughs, those areas of land 
represented by appointed, not elected, king’s men. It was understood 
that members of the assembly would be those of a disinterested nature, 
only willing to serve the public good.  As she noted: 
 
The design of a general assembly must ever be the good of 
the commonwealth, as conducive to their own general and 
particular good: this leads them to pitch on those persons, 
whose virtues and abilities are most capable to serve the 
public (1767, p. 15). 
 
 
 The functions of the legislature were primarily to enact legislation, 
especially with respect to money, and to hold the government 
accountable for its actions. Macaulay wrote: 
 
Parliament, viz, a right in the people of assembling by 
representatives, to assist in the making of new laws, the 
abolishing of old ones, or to give an assent or negative to the 
extraordinary levies of money…. It is against the franchises of 
the land for freemen to be taxed, but by their consent in  
Parliament (1763, p. 262, 369). 
 
 
 The legislature was entrusted with the making of new law, changing 
old laws, and protecting the rights of the people. She argued: 
 
That government is the ordinance of man; that, being the 
mere creature of human invention, it may be changed or 
altered according to the dictates of experience, and the 
better judgment of men; that it was instituted for the 
protection of the people, for the end of securing, not 
overthrowing, the rights of nature; that it is a trust either 
formally admitted, or supposed; and that magistracy is 
consequently accountable (1768, p. 403-404). 
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There was to be transparency in the operation of the legislature. 
Macaulay was suspicious of “the chicanery of practitioners and the 
vexatious prosecutions of the quarrelsome and the litigious” (1778, p. 240) 
who wanted to write the rules for their own purposes and not for the good 
of society. Instead, she saw the writing of legislation in the following terms: 
 
Every law, my friend, relating to public or private property, 
and in particular penal statutes, ought to be rendered so 
clear and plain, and promulgated in such a manner to the 
public, as to give a full information of its nature and contents 
to every citizen (1778, p. 369). 
  
The legislature also had power of the purse and was solely responsible for 
the raising of taxes in support of governmental operations. Finally, the 
legislature was to hold the executive branch accountable through inquiry 
into abuses. According to Macaulay’s view: 
 
When ministers are in disgrace with the sovereign, parliaments 
are encouraged to exercise their duty in enquiries into abuses 
(1778, p. 240). 
 
 
The legislature was thus justified for holding hearings into abuses of power, 




 When discussing the concept of the power to govern as emanating 
from the people, the people themselves become part of the argument. 
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Political philosophers are apt to see the people as units – families, 
communities, or possibly members of political parties. Macaulay observed 
society as a class-based unit. Given her aversion to the aristocracy, it is 
easy to understand her fear of interest groups as well.  
 Publius defined the problem of interests groups in Federalist #10, 
when he wrote: 
 
Factions are a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and 
actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, 
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent 




 A faction, or an interest group, was typically organized around the 
desire for control. Macaulay, a supporter of popular representation and 
the expansion of democratic endeavors which would dilute the 
concentration of power, knew the perils a faction could bring, “for that 
which constitutes the defects in all governments, are those principles in 
them which support a partial interest, to the injury of the public one” 
(1790b, p. 15). She addressed her remarks toward those she saw as the 
source of the problem; the aristocracy, as seen in their intrigues at the 
time of the Glorious Revolution, and the Tories, who frequently controlled 
Parliament and lay in servitude to the king, “for the lucrative prospect 
which a seat in Parliament gives for the enriching the representative” 
(1770, p. 17). The problem with factions was obvious, according to 
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Macaulay; they were simply a congregate of individuals, all prone to the 
foibles of a corruptible human nature: 
  
The generality of mankind are too fond of accustomed 
establishments, however pernicious in their nature, to adopt 
material alterations; and this propensity has ever afforded full 
opportunity to the interested to reject every part of 
reformation which tends effectually to establish public good 
on the ruins of private interest (1770, p. 9). 
 
 
 Pensioners, placemen, and others sworn to fealty with the crown 
had no cause for change as their powers flowed from the executive in 
charge, and “Thus control of parliament upon the executory power is lost” 
(1770, p. 15). The party in power expected benefits for their services. 
Macaulay accused the Tories of such behavior: 
 
The corruption of the tories arises from the badness of their 
hearts, and from thence infect their understanding. This 
political sect may justly be termed idol worshippers; they 
make a deity of human power, and expect particular 
benefits for their servile offerings (1778, p. 31). 
  
In order to minimize the problem with factions, Madison in Federalist 
#10 suggested removing the causes or controlling the effects. Since the 
removal of the cause was essentially the denial of liberty, relief was to be 
sought in controlling the effects, a suggestion Macaulay had made 
earlier. The number and situation of the majority had to be changed in 
order to prevent their controlling interest and this was accomplished 
through democratic policies, such as expansion of the franchise, a 
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rotation in office, and residence within the district one represented. As 
noted earlier, as concentrated power becomes diluted through the 
expansion of rights, democracy becomes a check on power. 
Unfortunately, that check on power was only as good as were the 
people, as Macaulay admonished: 
 
My friend, in a country like this, where party prejudice prevails 
in a manner to destroy even common sense; where the 
interested and the ignorant make up the great mass of the 
people, the favor of the multitude, as it is always founded on 




PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS A CHECK ON POWER 
Some public administration theorists argue that public 
administrators, in the performance of their duties, have an obligation to 
act as a check on power. Spicer notes: 
 
Public administrators can check the power of political leaders 
by raising questions with political leaders, by trying to 
persuade them to sometimes change course, and by 
interpreting political directors in a fashion that permits them to 
limit the costs imposed upon citizens (1995, p. 68). 
 
 
 By acting in a professional capacity, public administrators, through 
the use of administrative discretion, in the following of rules and 
regulations, and with the active participation of citizens, are entrusted 
with the duty of checking the power of both the executive and the 
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legislative branches in the event of a breach of public policy. At the same 
time, public administrators must also be checked to prevent their own 
abuse of administrative authority. 
 
Administrative Discretion  
In relation to the exercise of administrative discretion, the actions of 
public administrators may be viewed as either independent or 
instrumental; that is, the public administrator acts as an independent 
agent within the confines of governmental policies and procedures to 
promote the public interest, or public administrators may only act to carry 
out the will and wishes of the elected representatives of the people 
(Spicer, 1995, p. 55). Friedrich (1940) represented the independent view 
and was known for believing in “internal checks” held by the public 
administrator in concert with education, training, and the involvement of 
citizens in the action of government to promote the public interest. Finer 
(1941) argued from an instrumental perspective, requiring public 
administrators to be responsible to elected officials and the course of 
action of their choosing, rather than using independent judgment. 
Macaulay would argue that both views fail to account for human foibles: 
Friedrich failed to control the public administrator and Finer failed to 
control the elected official. Macaulay would favor the use of 
administrative discretion, within the boundary of law, as long as it was the 
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means to control arbitrary power and not used for purposes of self-
interest. 
Two examples serve to demonstrate Macaulay’s view of discretion 
checking the power of the executive. In 1631 Charles I was searching for 
ways to raise money without the approval of Parliament. He decreed that 
every man in possession of forty pounds a year for three years was to be 
summoned to the throne for knighthood and pay a commission for the 
service. Macaulay described the outcome: 
 
It is said, that above an hundred thousand pounds were 
brought into the treasury, extorted on this business of 
knighthood. The imposition was so universally disliked, that 
many of the sheriffs neglected to execute their orders and 
return the names of the persons qualified (1769, p. 102). 
 
 
The sheriffs acted on their own authority, failing to follow the political 
directive in order to protect the pending violation of their constituents, 
that is, the extortion of money in lieu of parliament-imposed taxes.  
In this next display of administrative discretion, the players are 
caught between two branches of government. Macaulay described the 
visit of Charles I to the town of Hull, the site of Parliament’s munitions 
magazine on the eve of the First Civil War: 
 
[The King] dispatched a messenger to Sir John Hotham with a 
letter, signifying he intended to visit his town of Hull and the 
magazine; that Sir John Hotham must provide for the 
reception of him and his train; he doubted not his obedience, 
else he must make his way into the town, according to the 
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laws of the land. Sir John Hotham called the chief magistrates 
of the town and officers of the garrison to council. It was 
resolved not to admit the King. A respectful message was 
sent, entreating him to forbear his intended visit. On his nearer 
approach, the bridge was drawn up, and the garrison put 
into a posture of defence (1769, p. 240).  
 
 
 Hotham’s example illustrates the difference between Friedrich and 
Finer. By consulting with the chief magistrates and officers of the garrison, 
Hotham was involving other citizens in deciding what was in the public 
interest, a method Friedrich advocated as an appropriate use of 
discretion. Had Hotham followed Finer’s recommendation, that is, to be 
responsible to the top official and follow that course of action, the 





 Another way in which public administration acts as a check on 
power is through encouraging active citizen participation. Since the reign 
of Edward I, an Englishman had the right to petition for a redress of 
grievances, thereby giving voice to complaints against the government. 
Macaulay’s history documented the many instances in which citizens 
delivered petitions to the King and the Parliament requesting relief from 
burdensome policies. Macaulay championed as heroes those men and 
women who acted with courage and determination to point out 
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weaknesses and defects to the ruling elite, “That there is an example of 
this kind in the history of my country, gives me infinite pleasure; that there 
are few I feel with sensible regret” (1769, p. 217). Citizen petitions and 
street demonstrations were among the few ways in which citizens could 
make their opinions known in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Here she described the people’s reaction to Charles’s offer to pardon 
followers of Parliament in turn for laying down arms against the King: 
 
The ill success which the popular party had met with had not 
so quelled their courage as to accept, on terms thus 
destructive, the arrogant mercy of the king: rather animated 
than subdued with the prospect of danger, a petition, signed 
by a large number of citizens, for raising every individual of 




  Macaulay’s advocacy for land reform and broader voting 
privileges suggests her support for greater citizen participation within 
government. Additionally, her system of education was designed to 
enlarge the numbers of qualified citizens to serve in government, training 
them in the sympathetic feelings necessary to govern. Macaulay would 
be leery of mob rule and majority factions assuming control, but she 
would support interested, active, citizen participation in the administration 
of government, in the accountability over government actions, and in the 
voicing of opinions to legislators and executives. As an example, during 
the English Civil War, Macaulay described a group of women who 
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petitioned Parliament to end the war. Receiving a less than desirable 
answer, the women held a public demonstration to make known their 
request and influence the outcome of the war: 
 
A petition on this subject was accordingly…presented to the 
Commons by two or three thousand women, with white silk 
ribbons in their hats. The house had the complaisance, after 
giving it a reading, to appoint a committee to wait on the 
petitioners, to assure them of the earnest desire of the house 
for peace, and that they did not doubt, in a short time, to 
answer the end of their petition. This general, though very civil 
answer was far from satisfying: The number of females, which 
crowded round and up to the doors of the house, and of 
men disguised in women’s clothes, were by noon increased 
to five thousand, crying out in a tumultuous manner, Peace! 
Peace! (1768, p. 30) 
 
 Citizen participation becomes another check in the arsenal of 
controlling the arbitrary exercise of power. Spicer notes how citizen 
participation provides an opportunity for citizens to make known how they 
may be potentially harmed by government policies (1995, p. 63). 
Macaulay interpreted this type of action in 1641 prior to the start of the 
Civil War when the House of Commons first began to exert its political 
strength. Many questioned the role of ecclesiastics in the House of Lords, 
as members of the church were typically most indebted to the King and 
most anxious to preserve the status quo. Macaulay wrote, 
 
Bishops maintaining their seats in parliament was an 
impediment to the progress of those good laws and motions 
which had been sent up by the Commons to the Peers. This 
declaration of the sense of the city was further enforced by a 
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petition, subscribed by aldermen, common-council men, 
subsidy men, and other inhabitants of the city of London 
…that bishops should be removed out of the house of Peers 
(1767, pp. 120- 121). 
 
As expressed by the citizens, the presence of the bishops was harmful in 
their attempt to establish more democratic representation.  
 Inclusion of citizens into the broadest possible involvement with 
government was supported in recent Public Administration history at both 
the Minnowbrook Conference of 1972 and within the later Blacksburg 
Manifesto, published as part of the refounding public administration 
movement. Stivers (1990) calls for active relationships between citizens 
and administrators; Goodsell (1990) desires a reorientation between 
public administrators and citizens; and Box (1995) and Ventriss (1995) 
support redefining public administration to include a more active citizenry. 
Macaulay would be at the forefront of this movement as it is the 
culmination of her two prime theories of governance: virtuous citizens 
getting involved in government, acting as a check on power on the 
grounds that, “The active consent of the people was the only legitimate 
justification for government” (1790b, p. 6). 
 
EDUCATION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
American Public administration pedagogy, since the founding of 
the discipline, had wavered between the education of generalists and 
specialists. Regarding the latter, Wilson’s desire was to “prepare better 
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officials as the apparatus of government” (1887, p. 23); Taylor was 
interested in “the deliberate gathering in on the part of those on the 
management side of all of the great mass of traditional knowledge…into 
a form of scientific management” (1912, p. 30); and Weber later taught 
that specialized management “usually presupposes thorough and expert 
training” (1946, p. 38). The early teaching of public administration was 
considered an applied one, focusing on finding solutions to practical 
problems, using the techniques and methodologies of social science, 
engineering, and economics.  
On the training of generalists, Paul Appleby wrote, “Governments 
exist precisely for the reason that there is a need to have special persons 
in society charged with the function of promoting and protecting the 
public interest” (1945, p. 124). Catharine Macaulay would concur with 
Appleby and would oppose the emphasis placed on experts, technicians, 
and scientists running government. Rather, she would suggest her 
educational system as the means by which Appleby’s special persons 
would learn the function of protecting the public interest: 
  
The peculiar excellence of a government, properly 
constituted, is to raise those to the administration whose 
virtues render them capable of this arduous task; and to 
deprive those of that office, who upon trial are found at all 
defective: therefore a well constituted government can 
never be so long ill administered as to become a grievance 
to the subject (1767, p. 9).  
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Macaulay’s educational theories have been earlier described. Her 
curriculum provided a broad, liberal education for both men and women 
in the belief that education was the means to happiness and perfection. 
She stated: 
 
 A system of education aims at bringing the human mind to 
such a height of perfection that it shall induce the practice of 
the best morals…. Education tends to instill the principles of 
equity and benevolence (1790a, p. 173, 236).  
 
Eschewing the Grand Tour of Europe for a curriculum steeped in the rigors 
of mathematics, history, philosophy, and languages, Macaulay intended 
to educate a class of citizens interested in the promotion of the public 
interest, through an understanding of reason, morals, and virtues: 
 
If the higher classes of the people have not wisdom, who will 
be the framers of those laws which enlighten the 
understandings of the citizens in the essentials of right and 
wrong? (1790a, p. 237) 
 
In Ralph Chandler’s review of the teaching of public administration, 
he requested more training in professional standards and ethics, as 
currently these areas “are not enough to deal with the conundrums which 
occupy much of the manager’s time and place heavy demands on his 
discretion. Knowledge and power are the stuff of public administration” 
(1989, p. 651). Macaulay, in both her republican and liberal capacities, 
would agree. She believed: 
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The education of the people may be said to comprehend 
the most important duties of government. Public education 
must comprehend good laws, good examples, good 
customs, a proper use of the arts, and wise instructions 
conveyed to the mind, by the means of language, in the way 
of speech and writing (1790a, p. 274).  
 
An educated citizen provided with the opportunity for land ownership, the 
right to vote, and the ability to participate in government, was the best 
means by which the force of society could continue to improve. 
  
The Civil Service 
 Any discussion of public administration and education would be 
remiss without including the civil service, the public personnel system 
based upon knowledge of the job to be performed, tested through 
impartial means, and awarded without bias. The federal Civil Service was 
reformed in 1883 to eliminate the tradition of the spoils system, in which 
the winning executive, typically through the political party, placed 
persons loyal to the party and the elected official, throughout 
administrative positions. The spoils system favored loyalty over 
competency, partisanship over principle. Frederick Mosher described the 
Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 as resulting from a need to 
eliminate corruption from within governmental operations while 
attempting to attract more talent to the government service (1968, pp. 65 
– 66). Mosher’s twentieth-century rationale reeks of eighteenth-century 
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republicanism. Woodrow Wilson strongly supported the creation of an 
impartial civil service, for it was, “the creation of statesmen whose 
responsibility to public opinion will be direct and inevitable” and who 
embodied the “motives, objects, policy, and standards of the 
bureaucracy”, not politics (1887, p. 23). To Wilson, the civil service 
represented the removal of politics from administration and created a 
class of “public spirited instruments of just government” who would 
conduct the business of government just as the business of a corporation. 
 Macaulay, like many Progressives, would have been in favor of the 
elimination of corruptive influences from any and all sources of 
governmental operations. Her comments regarding the education of a 
class of people to serve in government gives credence to both to the 
formation of civil service boards as well as Rohr’s theory that the higher 
reaches of the career civil service fulfill the framer’s original intent for the 
U.S. Senate (Rohr, 1990, pp. 38 - 39). Both Macaulay and Rohr’s see that 
the Senate would have wisdom and expertise not found in the lower 
house, that the Senate, like administrators, would be a check on power, 
and that both would exercise supervisory power over government 
personnel issues. Macaulay’s educated class was instilled with the wisdom 
to govern, meant to control the passions of men, and hold those in power 
accountable for their actions. Regarding the impartiality of the civil 
service, this would be most appealing to Macaulay. The opportunity for 
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any citizen, motivated by ambition and education, to successfully enter 
the administration of government would be an extension of democratic 
values. Entrance into government through civil service testing and 
appointment would be an encouragement to citizens committed to 
accountability, expansion of opportunity, and participation.  
 What Macaulay would fear would be experts running government. 
She was a champion of the citizen who actively participated in 
government. She espoused an educated workforce, not a trained one of 
managers making decisions based on management principles (Barnard, 
1938), or behavioral sciences as suggested by Simon (1947), or 
organizational theories typified by Katz & Kahn (1966). She would instead 
see public administrators as model citizens demonstrating their civic 
interests as responsible administrators (Cooper, 1998, Rohr, 1986, Wamsley, 
1990). Macaulay would view public administration as based on law, not 
management (Rosenbloom, 1983) and she would abhor the concepts 
promulgated by devotees of New Public Management (Bozeman, 2000, 
Kettl, 1994, Moore, 1995, Lynn, 1996) and the reinventing government 
movement (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) with its focus on efficiency, 
aggressive entrepreneurship, and outcomes over the most desired 
concepts of values, process, and deliberation. Macaulay would view New 
Public Management as returning to corrupt practices, noting a lack of 
transparency when private businesses assume public powers through 
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outsourcing and privatization of government; she would observe the 
possibility of manipulation in the effort to manage by measuring 
outcomes; and she would decry the failure to follow the rule of law.  
 
BENEVOLENCE 
 Whether referring to the character of Lady Bountiful or capturing 
the essence of republican ideology, Macaulay believed in the virtue of 
benevolence, a sympathetic understanding of the equality of mankind 
instilled with a desire toward service, observing that “When this benign 
affection holds a superiority in the mind to other affections, inclination will 
lead to the performance of the duties of humanity” (1790a. p. 275). 
Benevolence was the culmination of right action: 
 
If we trace the origin of those virtues in man, which render 
him fit for the benign offices of life, we shall find that they all 
center in sympathy. A strict adherence to the principles of 
equity may be said to include the perfection of moral 
rectitude (1790a, p. 275). 
 
 
Benevolence was a virtue that could be taught: to children through 
acts of charity, to the Prince through exposure to the lower elements of 
society, and to all classes of citizens through the practice of sympathy 
toward others. Practicing benevolence, Macaulay believed, would instill a 
motivation to do more for others and result in less selfish indulgences for 
purely pleasurable purposes. Benevolence was a moral principle as well 
121 
as an act of kindness; through repeated practice it would improve 
society. She wrote: 
 
Thus it will appear, that where we have power to direct the 
course of impression, we have power to command the state 
of the passions; and as laws, example, precept, and custom, 
are the prime sources of all our impressions, it must be greatly 
in the power of government to effect, by a proper use of 
these sources, that improvement on which true civilization 
depends (1790a. p. 276). 
 
 
The practice of benevolence, coupled with governmental action to 
reinforce feelings of sympathy, would promote peace, happiness, and the 
welfare of society. Specifically, Macaulay attached to this discussion 
comments regarding the care of the poor, the treatment of animals, 
houses of correction, and public executions (1790a, pp. 277 – 282), the 
latter similar in nature to Foucault’s (1977) treatment of the condemned.  
The word benevolence has many definitions within the field of 
public administration, with connotations ranging from eighteenth-century 
concepts denoting goodness and sympathy (Roberts, 1973) to Arendt’s 
twentieth-century ideal to care for fellow citizens (Dossa, 1984, pp. 165 – 
166). Niebuhr suggested that the concept of benevolence was included 
in almost every moral theory along with the ideas of justice, kindness, and 
unselfishness (1932, p. 27). Gawthorp (1998) described it as the desire for 
happiness for another, Hart (1989) grounded it in theories of civic 
humanism and the concept of civic obligation, and Frederickson and Hart 
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declared that public servants should be motivated by benevolence as a 
form of patriotism (1985, p. 547). Read all together, these authors suggest 
the concept of benevolence is found within the regime values of 
democracy, that is, justice, equality, liberty, fairness, and respect for 
common human dignity. Macaulay would agree. 
The extension of the Macaulay concept of benevolence to twenty-
first century public administration lies in the connection to regime values 
and the protection of individual rights. Macaulay would want a public 
administrator to be infused with these regime values and act as their 
guardian in the daily performance of duties. As Frederickson and Hart 
suggested: 
 
The ideal of American democracy assumes that a special 
relationship should exist between public servants and citizens. 
Stated briefly, it is the belief that all public administration must 
rest upon, and be guided by, the moral truths embodied in 
the enabling documents of our national foundation (1985, p. 
548). 
 
Public administrators properly educated in these regime values at 
the time of oath-taking become the guardians of liberty and equality. 
Based upon the rule of law, public administrators develop a special 
relationship with citizens, “For where much is given, much may be with 
justice required” (Macaulay, 1790a, p. 273). Macaulay would expect 
public administrators to embrace these concepts and practice them 
within the course of their daily activity. Discrimination, bias, and unequal 
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treatment would not exist in the practice of a benevolent public 
administration. Macaulay believed justice, fairness, and equality would 
endow the public good: 
Whatever the sanguine expectations formed from discoveries 
made in science, the convenience and happiness enjoyed 
by the world will be moderate, unless the united force of 
society is used toward the glorious work of improvement  





 Following closely upon the tenets of Macaulay’s view of 
benevolence is the concept of social equity, defined by Frederickson as, 
“activities designed to enhance the political power and economic well-
being of minorities” (1971, p. 330). Frederickson argues that public 
administrators should be committed to both good management and 
social equity and demonstrate that commitment by acting as change 
agents against institutionalized policies and structures that inhibit the 
political power and economic well being of others. Macaulay would 
concur, as “Political equality and the laws of good government are so far 
from incompatible, that one never can exist to perfection without the 
other” (1767, p. 12). Her views on gender and race, as previously 
discussed, indicated an openness to include all members of society in the 
social order and have them participate in government. Her advocacy on 
behalf of the common laborer to be eligible to vote, to own property, and 
to be educated indicates her predilection for equal opportunity. 
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Macaulay, considered a radical reformer in her time, used her political 
writings, personal correspondence, and her Member of Parliament brother 
to advocate for change. Macaulay embodied the spirit of Frederickson’s 
New Public Administration social equity theory. She provides the modern 
public administrator with a model for imbuing the practice of public 




 The Macaulay model of public administration derives its authority 
from the people. The model is based upon a separation of governmental 
powers, including distinct roles for the executive and legislative branches. 
The separation of powers is meant to control the corruptive influences of 
human nature as well as provide checks and balances within government 
itself. The model seeks to check power through the practice of public 
administration that permits the use of administrative discretion as 
prescribed by law; promotes active citizen participation in the operation 
of public administration; and is regulated through a strong civil service 
system. Finally, the model is characterized by benevolence, the belief that 
the democratic values of justice, liberty, and equality are to be protected 














With the twenty-first century emphasis on efficiency and 
effectiveness within American public administration, it is easy to lose sight 
of the values behind those concepts. The routinization of daily 
administrative practice may cause the practitioner to overlook the depth 
and complexity of such concepts as equality, democracy, and liberty. 
Fuller appreciation of the practice of public administration improves with 
an understanding of its basic, core values. One method by which this 
appreciation may be obtained is through an examination of the history of 
ideas. This dissertation has attempted to follow the history of ideas as 
presented by England’s eighteenth-century historian and philosopher 
Catharine Macaulay, by tracing the origins of core values held within the 
discipline of American Public Administration. Further, the purpose was to 
glean from Macaulay insight into the theories behind these concepts and 
draw from them applications for its practice. Finally, the intent of the 
dissertation was to contribute to the body of knowledge with respect to 
the legitimacy issue that pervades the field and to demonstrate that 
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centuries of political thought have presaged this discussion. Macaulay’s 
arguments regarding checks on power, the separation of powers, and the 
expansion of democratic practices plus her influence upon the men who 
helped guide it, grounds the legitimacy debate within the U.S. 
Constitution. The study of a variety of influences, including this specific one 
on Macaulay, weaves a richer tapestry displaying the evolution of 
American Public Administration, its understanding of self, and its 
contribution to daily life.  
 For purposes of this dissertation, the findings reveal a Macaulian 
paradox regarding human nature. She has both a dark cynical view of 
people and their passions as well as seeing a generous side capable of 
benevolence. In this respect she reflects beliefs held by those with a 
Lockean liberal interpretation of human nature as well as those of a more 
classical republican ilk. In turn, these disparate views of human nature 
result in two different schemes for how government should be organized 
and operated. Macaulay the liberal, demands the end to arbitrary rule, 
strict control on the use of power, and delineation between the powers of 
government with a firm emphasis upon the rule of law. Macaulay the 
classical republican, reveres ancient civilizations for the lessons they 
teach, is insistent upon education to achieve opportunity and increase 
freedom, and believes in the ability of humans to govern others out of a 
sense of impartiality and disinterestedness. Combining these ideas, 
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Macaulay offers a new interpretation to the values of the discipline, which 
includes an emphasis on limited government, democracy and 
participation, education, and a benevolent public administration 
grounded in service. Her contribution deserves additional analysis 
because it improves our understanding of what the good life is and who 
should rule. 
 Nearly everyone who hears the Macaulay story for the first time is 
fascinated by her life, her alliance with American friends at the time of the 
American Revolution, and her remarkable abilities as a writer and 
historian. As is apparent from this brief analysis of her writings, she brings 
complexity and nuance to the study of eighteenth-century political 
philosophy through her paradoxical views on human nature and her 
pioneering contribution to the inclusion of women into educational and 
social systems. Contrary to what some may believe at first glance, 
Macaulay has not been lost to the ages. Intellectual historians have found 
and noted her contribution to the development of political thought on this 
side of the Atlantic Ocean. Her rousing republican-oriented pamphlets 
and History inspired a new generation of government leaders to focus on 
popular sovereignty as the guiding principle for American government 
rather than monarchy (Bailyn, 1967, Wood, 1991). Similarly, educational 
theorists have acknowledged her role in the formation of educational 
curricula designed to transcend images of gender (Titone, 2004, Boos, 
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1976).  Recently, feminist theorists have begun studying Macaulay’s 
contribution within the public space of eighteenth-century Europe 
(Gardner, 1998, Gunther-Canada, 2006). It is now left to public 
administration theorists to find a place for her in the pantheon of political 
theory. 
 Assessing Macaulay’s impact, the first issue for students of public 
administration theory will be to place Macaulay in context to the thinking 
and orientation of others. The volumes of books arguing the ideological 
origins of political thought are numerous, and, like fashion, appear to 
change according to the seasons. Classical republican ideology gained 
dominance at a time when American theorists were looking to nobler 
causes behind public service and hoped that true disinterestedness 
actually existed. Macaulay’s high regard as the leading republican of her 
day coupled with her own esteem for the republicans of the 
Commonwealth era might suggest Macaulay’s inclusion under the label 
classical republican. She would be studied for her contribution to 
republican thought, the idolization of the man of virtue, and the emphasis 
on the need for a liberal education as a prerequisite for serving in 
government. 
 However, as earlier noted in this dissertation, Macaulay could also 
be classified as a Lockean liberal intent upon the checking of power. Her 
suspicion and antipathy toward unregulated power fills 3,500 pages of 
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English history. In telling story after story, in the detailing of wars, in the 
preparation for battles, and in actual military conflicts, Macaulay clearly 
made her case for the checking of power, the controlling of the methods 
of corruption, and the expansion of democratic principles in an effort to 
decentralize sources of power. She expounded on the merits of the 
separation of powers and the dangers resulting from interest groups to 
illustrate how humans, whose passions must be contained lest their lower 
natures gain hold, ought to be controlled against the unbridled self-
interest of power. Macaulay reveled in the theory that all persons are 
equal before the law. 
 Our difficulty in labeling Macaulay as either clearly a liberal or a 
classical republican offers an interesting lesson for the first decade of 
twenty-first century America. Caught as we are between blue states and 
red states, each representing the platforms and beliefs of the two 
dominant national political parties, perhaps we could learn to see the 
areas in which we agree rather than disagree. Macaulay as a republican 
and a liberal championed the liberty of individual citizens within society. 
She believed in the primacy of the rule of law and its corollaries that no 
one person was above the law and all citizens were equal before the law. 
Finally, in both her roles she was against the influences leading to 
corruption – the gifts in exchange for political support or the votes in 
exchange for political favors. Even with our deep divisions along 
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ideological lines it is hard to argue with the promotion of liberty, the 
obedience to fair and equal treatment under the law, and revulsion 
toward corruption. While our private natures may harbor misgivings and 
misdeeds, our public natures revere life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. Macaulay offers a lesson in understanding. 
 The second lesson to be gained from a study of Macaulay, and 
most suitable for students within a graduate program of public 
administration, concerns the role of education. Should there be an 
educated Guardian Class or are we better with open enrollment and 
equal opportunity? Macaulay would not favor an emphasis on narrowly 
trained technical experts measuring roadways and quantifying statistics. 
Instead, Macaulay would prefer a liberally educated citizen, as familiar 
with the republics of Greece and Rome as with Washington, D.C., with 
their attendant flaws, problems, and downfalls, to be qualified for 
government service. To understand government service, Macaulay’s 
student must understand the tenets of democracy and be as thoroughly 
grounded in the practice of benevolence as in the principles of efficiency 
and effectiveness. For Macaulay, benevolence was the external 
manifestation of democracy – all people are equal, all people deserve 
the same opportunity, and everyone is free. To practice Macaulayian 
public administration requires belief in this creed and its equal application 
toward all.  
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As with most things pertaining to public administration theory, one 
turns to Dwight Waldo for assistance in political theory research. In the 
preface to the second edition of The Administrative State he reflected 
upon the larger picture in which public administration existed and 
acknowledged that it came from a study of history. Macaulay and Waldo 
would have had an interesting conversation on the development of 
Anglo-American political thought and traditions. Waldo’s refrain for more 
political theory affirms the need for additional scholarly research into 
Macaulay and other Commonwealthmen and women of the 
seventeenth century who were so influential upon her, as well as the 
Founders (Robbins, 1959). With respect to Macaulay, there are three 
specific areas, germane to the study of Public Administration, which 
deserve more attention. First, the material presented in this dissertation 
represents her published material, which is part of the public domain. 
There exists substantial private correspondence held by libraries along the 
East Coast that could be examined for additional insight into her beliefs 
and practices. Her letters between John and Abigail Adams, Samuel 
Adams, and Mercy Otis Warren deserve further reading and analysis. Just 
as Macaulay can be labeled either republican or liberal, she at times 
argues as a Federalist and at other times as an Anti-Federalist. There is 
room for additional research in this area also.  
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The second study area is related to the first and concerns a 
comparative study between Macaulay and Publius. At this point in time, a 
connection between Macaulay and Alexander Hamilton and Macaulay 
and James Madison has not been established. Macaulay spent a large 
part of her year in America in New York City and was known to have met 
both Richard Henry Lee and Rufus King, friends of Hamilton’s. Macaulay’s 
ten days with George and Martha Washington in Mount Vernon, Virginia, 
puts her within traveling distance of Madison’s home. A personal 
acquaintance between these giants of political thought would be keen 
to establish. More importantly, an analysis and/or comparison of 
Macaulay to Publius regarding the formation of the U.S. Constitution 
would add new insight into the legitimacy discussion so alive within 
American public administration today. It would also strengthen how the 
history of ideas flows from one continent to another, from one country to 
another, and from one theorist to another. The short comparison of 
thought between Macaulay and Publius done in this dissertation 
demonstrates the need for additional in-depth research. 
The final area recommended for additional research in an effort to 
expand public administration theory concerns Macaulay herself. There is 
now a woman’s voice to add to the study of eighteenth-century political 
ideology. As a contemporary of Hume and Burke (Davies, 1988) she offers 
a counterpoint to the skepticism and conservatism previously thought of 
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as the dominant paradigm within political philosophy at the time. While 
she was neither the first female English historian nor the first female English 
philosopher, she was the first and only historian and philosopher who 
came to America and befriended the Founding Fathers. Although seldom 
told, the story of the American Revolution includes many women and 
Catharine Macaulay is on that list. Equally as important, as more women 
enter politics and government it is comforting to know that other women 
have come before and elegantly blazed a trail for the rest to follow. This 
remarkable and talented woman deserves inclusion in the legion of 
women who have ably served without notice, recognition, or fame. 
Perhaps through the study of more women and their contribution to the 
history of ideas, Macaulay’s goal to raise the consciousness of men will 
finally be achieved. 
It is to service that the final advice is offered. Thousands of public 
administrators are daily seeking some panacea to make the travails of 
public life easier. Any lessons learned from Macaulay and applied to the 
practice of public administration would be appreciated. Pocock wrote 
that political philosophers study ideas of the past in order to determine 
what is worth keeping, criticizing, or using for reflections about what ought 
to be in the consideration of politics (1965, p. 549). What is worth keeping 
about Macaulay is her emphasis on liberty, democracy, education, and 
benevolence. David Rosenbloom’s recent proposal for democratic-
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constitutional impact statements and scorecards (2007) may provide a 
possible means to operationalizing these values in administrative practice. 
These impact statements and scorecards offer a methodology whereby 
administrative reforms might be assessed for their possible impact, both 
positive and negative, upon democractic-constitutional values. 
Macaulay, if alive today, might well have encouraged the development 
of such assessments to guarantee no infringement on personal liberty, to 
maintain the constitutional integrity of the separation of powers, to 
facilitate the transparency of government through open records, and to 
reinforce the importance of the rule of law (Rosenbloom, 2007, pp.32-35). 
To Rosenbloom’s list, Macaulay might add appropriate measures 
regarding education, as in the No Child Left Behind Act, and the impact 
of homeland security issues with respect to individual liberty as evidenced 
within the American Patriot Act. As Rosenbloom admonishes, it is left to 
public administration to safeguard democratic-constitutional values 
intrinsic to our way of life. Public administration must not forget that its 
values represent the nexus of both liberal and republican attitudes toward 
government, as Macaulay so well stated two hundred and forty years 
ago: 
Government can never stand on better, never on firmer, 
never on equitable grounds, than on its good behavior. Just 
government will be felt, its advantages will be seen, its 
security will be fixed in the hearts of its subject, not to be 
shaken by the fantastic or selfish ends of individuals 
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